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The Jean Monnet Chair
The Jean Monnet Chair was created in 1988 by decision of the Academic 
Council of the European University Institute, with the financial support of 
the European Community. The aim of this initiative was to promote studies 
and discussion on the problems, internal and external, of European Union 
following the Single European Act, by associating renowned academics and 
personalities from the political and economic world to the teaching and 
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Ever since the beginning of the contemporary environmental movement 30 
years ago, market competition has been attacked as an engine of environmental 
destruction. Notwithstanding the spectacular environmental as well as eco­
nomic failures of centrally planned economies, the OECD nations with mar­
ket-based economies have adopted a far reaching system of central planning -  
command and control regulation -  in order to provide a clean and healthy 
environment. The dysfunctions and limitations of this central planning system 
are increasingly apparent. This essay argues for far greater use of market- 
based incentives to more effectively protect the environment while also pro­
moting economic goals and democratic accountability.
The relation between markets and environmental protection assumes a more 
complex character in the case of trade among states. In this context, there have 
been growing demands for adoption of uniform regulatory standards to gov­
ern economic activity throughout the common market. Uniform standards 
have been widely adopted in the United States and the European Union. The 
demand for uniform standards is now being debated in the context of interna­
tional trade. Uniformity is assertedly necessary in order to protect the envi­
ronment from the side-effects of competition in the extended market, and to 
protect the market itself from the side-effects of different regulatory standards 
in different states.
This essay argues that uniformity of environmental regulation throughout a 
common market is neither necessary nor desirable. While approximation of 
environmental measures may be desirable in some instances, differences are 
often appropriate, on both environmental and economic grounds. There is also 
wide opportunity for use of market-based incentives for environmental pro­
tection in the multistate context. Such incentives can go far towards reconcil­
ing environmental and economic goals while accommodating diversity and 
flexibility. The lock-step strategy of ever-widening command regulation must 
re-examined, and greater use made of alternatives better suited to the needs of 





























































































I. Markets, Regulation, and Economic Incentives
This part of the essay addresses the relation between markets and environ­
mental protection in the context of a single state. Part II addresses the relation 
in the context of trade among states.
A. The Failures of the Market and of Private Law to Protect the 
Environment
The ethical character of market organization of economic activity has been 
debated since the eighteenth century and is still a matter of deep controversy. 
But the failings of state socialism in the former Soviet Union, in Eastern 
Europe, and in many developing countries has stimulated renewed apprecia­
tion of the economic and political virtues of competitive markets in harnessing 
the efforts of managers to the demands of consumers, promoting efficiency in 
resource allocation, stimulating innovation, and avoiding undue concentration 
of political power. As a result, there have been many steps taken by nations 
throughout the world during the past fifteen years to abandon central plan­
ning, privatize state-owned enterprises, and scale back government regulation 
of economic activity.
Simultaneously with this development, however, there has also been a 
widespread trend toward the adoption of centrally planned regulation in order 
to control air and water pollution, deal with toxic wastes, and confront other 
environmental problems. Seemingly oblivious to the inherent and well-docu­
mented failures of Grosplan, these systems seek to produce environmental 
quality by issuing orders to thousands of individual facilities, prescribing the 
conduct of their operations in specific detail. What explains this seeming 
paradox?
The very success of the market system of competition in providing goods 
and services demanded by consumers tends to produce excessive amounts of 
pollution and wastes. This occurs because the market system fails to include 
prices for these side-effects of production and consumption. As a result, firms 
fail to bear the costs to society of pollution, wastes, and other environmental 
externalities which firms generate in competing for consumer favor. Simi­
larly, consumers do not bear the environmental costs associated with con­
sumptive activities, such as driving automobiles which pollute the air.1




























































































In theory, private law could solve this market failure by making firms or 
consumers pay compensation to those injured by these externalities. For a 
variety of reasons, however, private litigation is institutionally ill-suited to ac­
complish this task. For example, air pollution from a particular factory may 
potentially affect millions of individuals throughout an air basin. While each 
may suffer some increased risk of harm as a result of exposure, it is virtually 
impossible to show that such exposure caused a particular individual’s illness 
or property damage. Moreover, pollution is often created by dozens or hun­
dreds of sources, making the problem of establishing causal responsibility even 
more difficult. Litigation is costly, and the individual plaintiff s stake is often 
small. Case-by-case court litigation is also a poor means for resolving 
recurring scientific, economic, and engineering issues presented in environ­
mental controversies. Damage remedies are often inadequate because of the 
difficulties in tracing causation and quantifying injury. And, perhaps most im­
portant, the public demands protective measures to prevent harm from occur­
ring in the first place. The threat of private damage liability is too uncertain 
or weak to provide such protection.2
These failures of private law have become more pronounced and obvious in 
the past several decades in the face of mounting environmental problems at­
tributable to economic growth, technological advance, and population pres­
sures, and rising public concern over environmental problems. There are a 
variety of policy instruments which government might select to deal with the 
failures of the market and private law and protect the environment. For ex­
ample, government could impose a tax or fee on pollution. The government 
could issue a limited number of pollution rights and allow them to be bought 
and sold in the market. Government could subsidize measures to reduce pollu­
tion. It could impose a tax or deposit fee on wastes, containers, or packaging 
and provide a credit or refund for proper disposal. It could disseminate in­
formation regarding the environmental performance of products or firms to 
consumers and investors who might use their market power to reward firms 
with superior performance. Government and industry could negotiate con­
tracts calling for an overall reduction in pollution or wastes from a given 
facility or industry. These alternatives, however, have until recently played 
little or no role in environmental policy. In the United States, as elsewhere, the 
overwhelming instrument of choice has been command and control regulation. 
Pursuant to legislation, government agencies adopt specific prohibitions or 
requirements relating to pollution, wastes, resource management, land use, and 
development. These regulations are enforced against firms and individuals 
through licensing and permit requirements, enforcement actions, and sanctions 
for violations.




























































































B. The Drawbacks of Command and Control Regulation
Regulation appeals to lawmakers for several reasons. It responds to the pub­
lic perception that environmental degradation is evil and should be prohibited. 
Regulation promises the public that effective action is being taken to prevent 
harm from occurring in the first place. Regulatory programs, at least in their 
initial phases, are relatively easy to design, implement, and enforce. For ex­
ample, polluters can be required to install available technology for reducing 
pollution and sanctioned if they fail to do so. Regulation seems to “work”. 
Several decades of experience with regulation, however, has made clear im­
portant limitations in the command and control approach. Nonetheless, it re­
mains the bedrock of environmental law in the United States, Europe, and 
elsewhere.
Command and control environmental regulation relies principally on con­
trols on the amount and character of the pollution discharged and wastes gen­
erated by particular types of industrial processes and products. These re­
quirements are generally based on the level of control achievable by installa­
tion of best available technology, or BAT. Many environmental regulatory 
schemes also have environmental quality standards that specify the maximum 
amount of pollution permitted in the air, water, or soil. These standards, how­
ever, can only be achieved by controls on the processes and products respon­
sible for the pollution in question.3
Controls based on BAT reflect a simple premise: that industrial plants and 
products should incorporate available technologies to reduce pollution. 
Determining BAT for particular processes or products, however, requires 
government officials to consider complex engineering and economic factors.4 
Requirements are embodied in regulations or directives that generally apply 
uniformly to all plants or products of a given type. In the United States and 
elsewhere, this approach has proved relatively effective in achieving substan­
tial initial reductions in pollution. But experience has revealed important 
shortcomings, particularly in the context of a dynamic market economy:5
1. Uniform command and control requirements are economically quite 
wasteful because they ignore variations among facilities in the cost of reducing 
pollution, and also ignore geographic variations in pollution effects. A more
See Richard Stewart, Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law: A Conceptual 
Framework, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 1259 (1981).
See Robert Crandall, Controlling Industrial Pollution (1983).
This discussion is adapted from Bruce Ackerman and Richard Stewart, Reforming 




























































































cost-effective strategy of risk reduction could free enormous resources for 
additional pollution reduction or other societal purposes.
2. Command and control approaches tend to impose disproportionate bur­
dens on new products and processes. Regulators typically impose far more 
stringent and costly controls on new sources because there is no risk of shut­
down and unemployment. Also, new plants and products must run the gauntlet 
of regulatory proceedings to win approval; the resulting uncertainty and delay 
discourage new investment. BAT standards also impose disproportionate bur­
dens on more productive and profitable industries because these industries can 
“afford” more stringent controls. This “soak the rich” approach penalizes 
growth and international competitiveness.
3. BAT controls can ensure that established control technologies are in­
stalled. But they do not provide strong incentives for the development of new, 
environmentally superior strategies, and may actually discourage their devel­
opment by locking. Moreover, BAT controls often focus on “end of pipe” 
technologies that can be widely applied, rather than processes changes and 
other pollution prevention strategies, which tend to be specific to particular 
facilities.
4. BAT involves the centralized determination of complex scientific, engi­
neering, and economic issues regarding the feasibility of controls on hundreds 
or thousands of pollution sources. Such determinations impose massive infor­
mation-gathering and decision-making burdens on administrators, and tend to 
produce rigid, uniform requirements that are excessively costly or otherwise 
inappropriate as applied to particular facilities or products.
5. A BAT strategy is inconsistent with intelligent priority setting. Simply 
regulating to the hilt whatever pollutants happen to get on the regulatory 
agenda often results in large expenditures to address relatively minor prob­
lems, and may preclude the government from dealing adequately with more 
serious problems that come to scientific attention later. BAT also tends to re­
inforce regulatory inertia.
These criticisms are not theoretical. They reflect the results of detailed em­
pirical study. For example, of twelve U.S. studies of the costs of regulating 
various air pollutants, seven indicated that traditional command and control 
regulation was more than 400% more expensive than the least-cost solution; 
four revealed that it was about 75% more expensive; one suggested a modest 
cost-overrun on 7%.6 Even if a reformed system could cut costs by “only”
6 See Ackerman and Stewart, supra, at 175-176. Other studies showed similar inefficien­




























































































one-third, it could save more than $14 billion a year on air pollution control 
expenditures in the United States alone.7 The scope of potential savings is re­
flected in the United States in the fact that annual expenditures alone to comply 
with federal pollution control laws were estimated by EPA at $115 billion in 
1990, rising to $185 billion by 2000.8 While such expenditures are greater, in 
absolute amounts, in the United States than in any other single nation, and 
while the legal system and regulatory culture of the United States exacerbates 
the defects of command regulation, the gains from more efficient approaches 
to environmental protection in other nations would also be great.
The dynamic failings of the command and control system are also notable. If 
we are going to maintain, much less improve, environmental quality in the 
face of continued economic growth, it is imperative to develop new, environ­
ment-friendly means of meeting consumer demands. Central planning direc­
tives that assign pollution control quotas to individual facilities and prescribe 
in detail how they must be achieved stifle diversity and innovation, and fail to 
provide positive incentives for the development of environmentally superior 
processes and products. Instead, we should strive to harness the energies and 
incentives of the market system to protection of the environment in order to 
ensure that environmental goals are met more efficiently, reward managers 
who devise new and better ways of meeting economic and environmental ob­
jectives, and dismantle the environmental central planning bureaucracy. We 
cannot perpetuate an ever-expanding, ever, and ultimately incoherent array of 
Procrustean orders.
A final, critical failing of the central planning approach to environmental 
protection is that it undermines democratic accountability. Decisions about 
what environmental problems should be addressed and the level of resources 
that should be directed at solving them are made through a remote bureau­
cratic process. The process consists of a myriad of separate and often uncoor­
dinated standard-setting exercises involving archane engineering and economic 
issues. The decision making process is driven by bureaucratic objectives and 
routines and by interest group “insiders” with the specialized knowledge and 
resources to monitor and influence decisions of concern to their constituencies. 
Environmental policy is the aggregate of these myriad decisions, which are 
very difficult for the public political process to monitor or control.
See Portney, Air Pollution Policy, in Portney (ed.), Public Policies for Environmental 
Protection 65 (1990) (reporting projected cumulative expenditures on air pollution control 
for 1979-1988 at $427.71 billion).




























































































C. The Advantages of Market-Based Incentives Systems for 
Environmental Protection
The most powerful market-based incentives are taxes and tradeable permit 
systems. These two systems share important advantages over command and 
control central planning. Both place a price on pollution and waste. Taxes do 
so directly, tradeable permit systems indirectly by limiting the total number of 
marketable permits and thereby imposing an opportunity cost on their use. 
Both systems also decentralize to facility managers the decision as to how 
much to reduce pollution or waste and how to accomplish it. These managers 
have strong incentives to achieve continuing reductions in pollution or waste; 
in doing so they will increase their profits, either by paying less in taxes to the 
government or selling to other firms pollution permits that they no longer 
need. Moreover, they have the flexibility to achieve these reductions by what­
ever means they can devise, as compared to the lock-step regulatory approach 
in which all facilities within a given category must meet the same standard. 
Under a tax or tradeable permit system, those facilities with relatively low 
pollution reduction costs will find it profitable to achieve large reductions and 
thereby avoid paying so much in taxes or for permits. On the other hand, 
firms with relatively high costs will do relatively less in the way of reductions, 
finding it relatively cheaper to pay taxes or buy permits for their extra dis­
charges. The resulting redistribution of the overall abatement burden from 
high-cost to low-cost abaters will ensure far more cost-effective achievement 
of overall environmental protection goals than under the lock-step command- 
and-control system.
In addition, economic incentives would encourage source reduction, shifts in 
economic activity among sectors, and structural changes; the Commission Task 
Force on the Environment and the Internal Market found that such changes 
would be needed to achieve environmental quality goals in the face of the 
pressures unleashed by the internal market and that traditional regulatory 
controls would not be able to achieve such changes.9
The market-based systems also reduce costs by encouraging and rewarding 
experimentation and innovation. In addition, the penalty imposed by the BAT 
system on new products or facilities and on more profitable industries will be 
eliminated; all emitters of the same pollutant or generators of the same waste 
must pay the same fee or permit price. The need for a large central planning 
bureaucracy to write detailed regulations will be eliminated. The government 
must select the level of the pollution tax, or determine the total amount of
Task Force on the Environment and the Internal Market, “1992,” the Environmental 




























































































pollution allowed and permits issued. But the decisions as to how each facility 
will limit pollution will be made by individual firms.10
The fact that the decisions made by government are much more limited in 
character promotes democratic accountability. Decisions on the overall level 
of pollution taxes or the overall amount of pollution to be allowed are much 
easier for the public to understand and the political process to control than a 
shifting array of highly technical BAT standards. For the same reason, these 
market based approaches make it easier to monitor and adjust overall priority 
setting.
The advantages of using information-based strategies to encourage consumer 
and investor demand for environmental quality are similar, although in this 
case the government no longer controls the overall level of demand for envi­
ronmental quality. The demand is set directly by the public.
Deposit and return systems, which can include toxic and other wastes as well 
as containers and packaging, have a hybrid character. In order to obtain a re­
fund, a waste generator or consumer must meet specified regulatory require­
ments, such as treating and safely disposing of toxic wastes or returning a bev­
erage container to a collection center. However, the requirement of paying an 
initial fee is a form of tax that creates incentives to reduce the generation of 
waste or the use of excess packaging, or non-recyclable containers. In addi­
tion, the prospect of a refund provides a strong incentive for compliance with 
treatment and disposal requirements, and can make “midnight dumping” un­
profitable. The level of the fee is a politically visible decision that the public 
can easily review and assess.
Environmental covenants or contracts consist of negotiated agreements be­
tween government authorities and industry on comprehensive targets and 
timetables for reductions of pollution or other risks in lieu of piecemeal regu­
latory requirements for specific types of pollution from particular facilities or 
plant units. Such agreements allow firms flexibility and a substantial amount of 
time to achieve designated reductions in overall pollution or risks in the most 
cost-effective way. The government which contracts for environmental quality 
on behalf of the public, achieves a greater level of reduction than would be 
attained by otherwise applicable command and control requirements. The 
contract can be set either on an industry-by-industry basis, or facility-by- 
facility. In the former case, democratic accountability can be maximized if the 
overall level of reductions demanded of different industries is coordinated as 
part of a national environmental plan that sets overall reduction goals and then
10 See Project 88: Harnessing Market Forces To Protect Our Environment (1988); Project 




























































































allocates needed reductions among different industry sectors. This is the ap­
proach to environmental contracting taken by the Dutch.11 Alternatively, if 
reductions are negotiated on a facility-by-facility basis, the community in 
which a given facility is located can effectively monitor and influence the 
decision.
There are, of course, various problems that must be addressed in the design 
and implementation of market-based incentive systems. For example, both tax 
and transferable permit system require accurate monitoring of emissions or 
waste generation, and sanctions on those who fail to pay their taxes or who ex­
ceed their permit limits. Under a tradeable permit system the government 
must also keep track of permit ownership and record transfers. But monitor­
ing and enforcement are also required under command and control systems. 
Indeed, the government will have a stronger interest in enforcing a tax system 
or a system of auctioned pollution rights because its own revenues are at stake. 
Fee systems may, however, be inappropriate if it is necessary to achieve a 
precise level of overall discharges, because it may be difficult for the govern­
ment to select the fee level that will induce firms in the aggregate to just 
achieve that level. The advantages of both fee and transferable permit systems 
is greatest if there are large numbers of sources generating pollution in the 
same airshed or water body. In such a situation, however, these systems may 
generate “hot spot” problems if polluting facilities utilize the flexibility which 
the systems afford to locate in the same vicinity. These systems can nonetheless 
be adjusted to restrict clustering of pollution sources, as some loss in effi­
ciency. In general, there are no grounds for supposing that market-based sys­
tems will be more administratively difficult than the prevailing regulatory ap­
proach, and good reasons for concluding that they will in many respects be 
much simpler to implement.1 2
Environmentalists have objected to fees and transferable permits as a 
“license to pollute” that allows the rich to degrade the environment with im­
punity. This criticism is misplaced on several grounds. It is the command and 
control regulatory scheme which confers a “license to pollute”. The residual 
pollution allowed by regulatory requirements is free to the polluter. By con­
trast, under a tax or tradeable permit system, a source must pay or bear a cost 
for each and every unit of pollution to the commons. Imposing a price on re­
sidual emissions is not only more equitable, but also more efficient because it 
provides a continuing incentive for firms to devise ways to achieve further 
pollution reductions. Also, in a competitive market even a wealthy firm will
11 See Jan M. van Dunne, Environmental Contracts and Covenants: New Instruments in a 
Realistic Environmental Policy? (1993).




























































































not continue to pollute if it can increase its profits by reducing pollution and 
thereby reduce its taxes or free up pollution rights for sale to others.
D. Applications of Market-Based Incentive Systems
The use of market-based instruments for environmental protection is not just 
the stuff of theory; it is already a reality in practical application in the United 
States and elsewhere. In several areas of environmental policy, market-based 
instruments are in place and operating with general and often great success.
Trading Air Pollution Control Requirements. The United States has used 
transferable permit systems to deal with a variety of air pollution problems. 
The Environmental Protection Agency pioneered the use of trading systems 
that allow a plant to reallocate regulatory limitations on emissions of the same 
pollutant among different locations in the same plant and also different plants 
to reallocate control burdens.13 The resulting flexibility has allowed firms to 
achieve large savings without sacrifice of environmental quality.
The U.S. Acid Rain Program. 1990 Amendments to the U.S. Clean Air Act 
adopted a trading system as an integral part of an ambitious program to deal 
with acid precipitation by reducing total sulfur emissions in the U.S. by 50% 
over ten years.14 The foundation of this program is a system of SO2 emissions 
allowances. Each allowance enables the holder to emit one ton of SO2 in a par­
ticular year, or a subsequent year. The allowances may be freely bought and 
sold and used anywhere in the continental United States. EPA is to issue 
allowances to existing sources, in proportion to their energy output; this allo­
cation rewards sources that have already reduced their emissions. New sources 
must obtain allowances from existing sources. Allowances are racheted down 
in a two-phase process in order to achieve the 50% reduction.
The Act allows facilities total flexibility in deciding how to reduce emissions 
and how much to reduce emissions. Firms can, for example, seek to reduce 
pollution by installing five gas desulfurization scrubbers or lower-pollution 
combustion technologies such as fluidized bed processes. They may switch to 
cleaner fuels, such oil, natural gas, or low sulfur or washed coal. They may 
reallocate capacity utilization from high-polluting to low-polluting units. They
13 For a review of EPA trading programs, see R. Liroff, Reforming Air Pollution 
Regulation: The Toil and Trouble o f EPA's Bubble (1986); Hahn & Hester, Where Did 
All the Markets Go? An Analysis o f EPA’s Emissions Trading Programs. 16 Yale J. 
Reg. 109 (1989); Dudek & Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why is This Thoroughbred 
Hobbled?, 13 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 217 (1988).




























































































can shut down existing units and build new, less-polluting facilities. They may 
adopt renewable energy technologies. Or they may seek to reduce emissions by 
lowering consumption of energy through demand management techniques such 
as energy pricing schemes to reduce peak demand or assisting customers, 
through interest-free loans and information services, to adopt conservation 
measures such as insulation, low flow shower heads, and energy efficient 
lighting technologies. The flexibility thus afforded to firms is expected to re­
duce the cost of achieving the 50% reduction in SO2 emissions from $5 billion 
a year to $4 billion or less.
Allowances are issued for each year. However, units can trade allowances 
for future years. In addition, the Act appears to contemplate “banking” of al­
lowances. For example, if a facility doesn’t use all of its 1998 allowances, it 
can save or “bank” the unused allowances for its own use in later years, or sell 
the unused allowance to others for their future use. EPA must establish a cen­
tral accounting system to keep track of allowance transfers. Sources must in­
stall continuous emissions monitoring systems to monitor SO2 emissions and 
report the results to EPA. There have been a number of trades in allowance 
futures thus far, and the Chicago Board of Trade has petitioned EPA for 
permission to set up a futures market in SO2 allowances.15
The Southern California RECLAIM Program. Non-attainment of ozone 
(smog) standards in urban areas has become the most serious compliance 
problem under the Clean Air Act. The South Coast Air Quality Management 
District in California, which encompasses greater Los Angeles, has concluded 
that the traditional command and control regulatory system has reached its 
limits. In lieu of traditional regulation, the District was adopted a marketable 
permits program for emission of hydrocarbons (HC) and oxides of nitrogen 
(NOx), which interact in the atmosphere to produce ozone smog. Allowances 
for each pollutant will be issued to existing sources. The initial markets will 
include about 400 HC and NOx emitting facilities. Each covered facility is 
subject to a cap on facility-wide emissions, aggregated under the “bubble” 
principle. The emissions cap for each facility will then be reduced annually, by 
percentages geared to compliance with the “reasonable further progress” 
requirements for non-attainment areas established by the 1990 Clean Air Act 
Amendments. Sources may, however, freely trade emission rights with each
15 For discussion of the sulfur trading program, see Van Dyke, Emissions Trading to 
Reduce Acid Deposition, 100 Yale L.J. 2707 (1992); Bartels, Marron & Lipsky, Clean 
Air, Clear Market: Making Emissions Trading Work: The Role of a Computer-Assisted 
Auction, 131 Pub. Util. Fortnightly, June 15, 1993, 14. Recent Developments, The 
Clean Air Act Amendments o f 1990 and the Use o f Market Forces to Control Sulfur 
Dioxide Emissions, 28 Harv. J. Legis. 235 (1991); Dennis, Smoke for Sale: Paradoxes 
and Problems of the Emissions Trading Program of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 




























































































other. At present, there will be separate markets for SO2 and NOx, although 
the possibility of interpollutant trading is being studied. Trading areas are 
zoned to avoid creation of “hot-spots” as a result of emissions bunching. There 
is an elaborate system of monitoring requirements to ensure current tracking 
of emissions. It is estimated that the trading system will reduce compliance 
costs by hundreds of millions of dollars annually and save thousands of jobs 
that would otherwise be lost.16 States in the northeastern United States are 
considering the development of an interstate trading system to combat their 
regional ozone pollution problem.
The Lead Phase-down Program. During the 1980s EPA issued regulations 
reducing, on a phased basis, the allowable lead content of gasoline. The agency 
simultaneously authorized trading, within and among refiners, of the remain­
ing allowed content of lead in their gasoline, and permitted firms who 
achieved extra reductions ahead of schedule to sell lead credits to others for 
whom refinery modifications were more difficult or costly. To provide leaded 
gasoline producers and importers with additional flexibility in complying with 
the new limits, the agency issued regulations permitting producers and im­
porters whose gasoline in 1985 contained less lead per gallon than the appli­
cable standard to “bank” lead content credits and apply them to future re­
quirements or sell them to others.
Banking and trading were active and resulted in cost savings on the order of 
hundreds of millions of dollars over the few years of the program, as well as 
lessening opposition from small refineries facing high costs for reducing lead 
in gasoline. The program successfully reduced the lead content in gasoline by 
ninety percent.17
Chlorofluorocarbon Reduction. The U.S. is using trading and taxes as tools 
in the effort to phase out chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) in order to protect the 
stratospheric ozone layer. To implement the 1987 Montreal Protocol and the 
national legislation following from it, the EPA has issued regulations requir­
ing a phase-out of CFC production and consumption by the year 2000. It is 
implementing the phase-out by issuing depreciating allowances to each pro­
ducer and importer of CFCs. CFC producers, importers, and other interested 
parties may trade these allowances. In addition to issuing CFC allowances, the 
United States has imposed a tax on CFC production and importation. Like the
16 Dwyer, The Use of Market Incentives in Controlling Air Pollution: California’s 
Marketable Permits Program, 20 Ecol. L. Quarterly 103 (1993).
17 For discussion, see Barry D. Nussbaum, Unleaded Gasoline Transition in the U.S.: The 




























































































allowance trading system, this tax provides a market for the development and 
use of substitutes for CFCs.18
Environmental Contracting and Covenants. The Netherlands has recently 
begun to use environmental contracts on an industry-wide basis as a means of 
achieving the ambitious pollution reduction goals contained in its National 
Environmental Policy Plan. This plan sets comprehensive, multi-media na­
tional targets for pollution reduction and environmental improvement over the 
next twenty years, with interim benchmarks.19 Each industry is allocated a 
designated share of the require reductions and improvements. The responsible 
government authorities and a number of industry groups, such as the basic 
metals industry, have signed or are currently negotiating contracts in which 
the industry agrees to achieve the overall targets assigned to it. In return, the 
government agrees to substitute the contractual arrangements for the pollutant- 
by-pollutant regulations otherwise applicable, and to restrict charges in 
requirements during the period of the contract. The plan’s purpose is to give 
industry flexibility to achieve overall reductions in a more cost-effective 
fashion and to provide it with relative certainty regarding requirements over 
an extended period of time in exchange for greater reductions than would oth­
erwise be required or achieved. If industry facilities fail to meet their com­
mitments, they face penalties and reinstatement of the traditional regulatory 
requirements. Similar agreements are being negotiated in Germany, Belgium, 
and Denmark.20 Japan has followed an approach under which local munici­
palities negotiate agreements of varying degrees of comprehensiveness with 
individual industrial facilities.21
The U.S. has had limited experience with the contractual approach. Congress 
adopted an ambitious program of technology-based controls for 191 specified 
toxic pollutants in section 112 of the 1990 Clean Air Act,22 but section 112 
also authorizes an alternative “early reduction” program. Industries that 
achieve a 90% reduction in toxic pollutants before the EPA promulgates 
regulations imposing technology-based regulatory controls are exempt from 
compliance with the new regulations for five years after they come into ef­
fect.23 In this provision, the government is essentially offering a unilateral 
contract, promising sources flexibility and assurance against future modifica­
18 See S. Seidel and D. Blank, Closing an Ozone Loophold, Envtl Forum, Nov.-Dee. 
1990, at 18, 20.
19 Jan Van Dunne, supra.
20 See id.
21 See Julian Grosser, et a l ,  Environmental Law in Japan, at 229-79; Bruce E. Aronson, 
Review Essay, Environmental Law in Japan, 1 Harv. Int’l L. Rev. 135, 143 47.
22 Clean Air Act, §112(h), 42 USC §7412(h).




























































































tion of requirements for a limited time. In exchange, the government receives 
substantial reductions earlier than it could through the cumbersome system of 
command-and-control regulation, which requires years of rule making pro­
ceedings and other steps to implement new controls.
Other Market-based Incentive Programs. Many states in the U.S. have 
adopted deposit/refund programs for beverage containers. Some municipalities 
have instituted charges for deposit of household waste based on its weight and 
content, charging more, for example, for wastes containing non-recyclable 
material. The European Union and several of its member states have adopted 
ecolabel programs for consumer products. The U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission requires companies whose stock is listed on stock exchanges to 
disclose to investors environmental requirements and liabilities that are finan­
cially material. Germany, and the Netherlands have imposed taxes on water or 
on pollution. In most instances, however, these charges are designed to raise 
revenues to cover the administrative costs of environmental regulators or the 
costs of joint treatment of effluent, rather than to provide incentives for limit­
ing pollution.
E. Conclusion
There is enormous scope for expanded use of market-based incentives sys­
tems in order to better promote economic and environmental objectives and 
enhance the democratic accountability of government decisions on environ­
mental protection priorities and resource commitments. Market-based incen­
tive system are not a panacea, and are not appropriate for every type of envi­
ronmental problem. But the single-minded attachment to central planning that 
has dominated environmental law and policy must be abandoned in favor of a 





























































































n . Environmental Protection in a Regime 
of Trade Among States
The relation between environmental protection and markets become more 
complex in a plural system of many states bound by a common free trade 
market. The United States, the European Union, and international trade among 
nations are different versions of such a system. This part of the essay first 
summarize the rationale for free trade. It then considers the arguments for and 
against uniformity of environmental regulation throughout a given free trade 
regime. The relation between trade and environmental protection is then 
examined in the specific context of three different types of environmental 
problems:
Products. Examples of environmental problems posed by products include 
automobile air pollution, pesticide residues on foods, and the release of ozone- 
depleting chemicals from refrigeration units.
Processes, including industrial and product manufacturing processes, and 
forestry, mining, agriculture, fishing and other resource extraction and man­
agement processes for production of products. Environmental problems posed 
by processes include air pollution, water pollution, soil contamination, and 
habitat destruction.
Wastes. Examples of environmental problems caused by wastes include toxic 
and radioactive contamination.
This Part also examines the relation between environment and trade in the 
context of the different political and institutional structures of the USA, the 
European Union, and the international community. It concludes with an 
examination of the contribution which market-based incentives might make 
toward promoting environmental and economic objectives in these settings.
A . The Free Trade Regime and the Rise of Environmental 
Regulation
The cornerstone of the case for free trade is the mutual economic benefit re­
sulting from trade among nations with differences in comparative advantage in 
producing goods and services. This concept has been characterized by Paul 
Samuelson as “the sole proposition in the social Sciences which is both true and 
non-trivial”.24 In the classic Ricardian conception, comparative advantage was
24 David Robertson, Trade and the Environment: Harmonization and Technical Standards. 




























































































based on relative differences in physical factor endowments -  such as the 
character of agricultural land, climate, timber, and mineral resources -  among 
nations.25 But an enlarged conception of comparative advantage has come to 
include differences in human capital and industrial and technological infras­
tructure. No reason exists in principle why comparative advantage should not 
also encompass differences in the ability of ecosystems and populations to as­
similate pollution, and also differences in national economic, social, and regu­
latory policies and legal and administrative systems.
There are additional reasons, beyond comparative advantage, why free trade 
enhances the welfare of all nations engaging in trade. A wider market en­
hances the opportunity to realize economies of scale. It also promotes special­
ization, with attendant gains in productivity. A greater array of suppliers stiff­
ens the efficiency-promoting discipline of competition. The wider network of 
contacts accelerates the diffusion of knowledge and technological innovation.
Experience confirms the economic benefits of a free trade regime (FTR). 
Empirical studies show a strong correlation between the degree of trade lib­
eralization and economic growth rates among different nations and a similar 
correlation between changes in trade policy and growth in individual 
nations.26
The economic benefits from a common market and the perceived detriments 
from trade rivalry among the American states under the Articles of 
Confederation were an important impetus for the ratification and adoption of 
the United States Constitution.27 Moreover, the expected gains from the cre­
ation of a common market and common currency were not purely economic; 
it was thought that economic integration would advance political integration 
and mutual security. Similar considerations propelled the creation and subse­
quent strengthening of the European Union. Economic rivalry was thought to 
breed political conflict and to have contributed to the outbreak of three large- 
scale wars in Europe within seventy-five years. Europeans believed that eco­
nomic integration would ameliorate the causes of political and military 
conflict.
Economic integration was seen as a global imperative after World War II. 
Many western leaders thought that restrictive trade policies by major nations
25 David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economic and Taxation 113-17 (London, George 
Bell & Sons 1891).
26 See Anne O. Krueger, Perspectives on Trade and Development 57-62 (1990); Anne O. 
Krueger, Trade Policy as an Input to Development, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 288 (1980).





























































































in response to the Great Depression were a major cause of the continued eco­
nomic stagnation of the 1930s. The development of a coordinated international 
monetary policy at Bretton Woods and the promotion of trade liberalization 
through the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were corner­
stones of global prosperity. The post-war creation of a global FTR was a ma­
jor factor behind the spectacular growth of the global economy in the follow­
ing three decades.28
The rise of environmental regulation has created a threat of conflict between 
trade and environmental objectives. On the one hand, free traders have feared 
that states’ environmental regulations represent a serious non-tariff barrier to 
trade. On the other hand, environmentalists fear that the FTR will undermine 
national efforts to adopt more protective environmental controls and drive 
environmental regulation towards the lowest common denominator.
Both the United States and the European Union have experienced internal 
controversy over the legality of state environmental regulations that assertedly 
threaten free trade. In the international context, environmentalists’ fears con­
cerning the trade regime were ignited by the Gatt panel decision in the Tuna 
Dolphin case, invalidating, as contrary to GATT, U.S. legislation banning im­
ports of tuna caught by Mexican fishing boast on the high seas because of their 
failure to comply with U.S. regulations on the incidental take of dolphin while 
fishing for tuna.29 The asserted conflict between environmental regulation and 
free trade was a major issue in the negotiation of the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and was also a topic of concern in the conclusion 
of the GATT Uruguay Round and the creation of a World Trade Organiz­
ation. It is thus important to understand the relation between environmental 
regulation and trade in order to clarify the debate and find new institutional 
means for reconciling economic and environmental goals.
B. Arguments for and Against Uniformity in Environmental 
Regulation Among Trading States
Because of dominant reliance on command and control regulation to deal 
with environmental problems, the trade-environment debate has been framed 
around the following questions: Should states be free to adopt whatever level 
of environmental regulation they wish? Should uniform standards be adopted? 
If uniform standards are adopted, should individual states be precluded from 
adopting more stringent standards?
28 See Jagdish Bhagwati, Protectionism (1988).
29 GATT: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of 




























































































Environmentalists tend to favor adoption of uniform standards at a high 
level of protection, but maintain that states should be free to adopt more strin­
gent standards. Free traders tend to favor allowing each state to adopt its own 
standards for regulation processes within its borders; allowing each state to 
adopt-non-discriminatory standards with respect to waste shipment and dis­
posal; and the adoption of common standards for products, precluding the 
ability of individual states to adopt more stringent standards. The resolution of 
this debate turns on consideration of several different factors.30
Threats to Free Trade Posed by Different State Environmental Standards. 
Differences in environmental regulatory standards among states linked by free 
trade may threaten free trade and diminish the benefits that it provides. As de­
veloped more fully below, this threat is potentially significant in the context of 
product regulation, where differences in state regulatory standards can create 
trade barriers and excessive transaction costs. Differences in the regulatory 
standards applicable to wastes, however, are unlikely to have similar adverse 
results, so long as a state applies the same standards to out-of-state wastes as it 
applies to its own states. The trade-based argument for uniformity does not 
apply at all to differences in process standards. The fact, for example, that 
state A has more or less stringent air pollution control regulations for manu­
facturing plants than state B does not in any way obstruct trade between them.
Differences among States in Assimilative Capacity. Different states may ap­
propriately adopt different environmental regulatory standards in order to 
reflect differences in environmental, economic, and social circumstances. 
Geographic, ecological, and demographic variations among nations affect the 
ability of different nations to assimilate pollution and other forms of natural 
resource exploitation. A nation with fast-running, short rivers, can assimilate a 
higher level of water pollution with less environmental harm than nations with 
long, slow-running rivers. A British official is reported to have said: “Italy 
economically benefits from the amount of sunshine that it receives each year. 
Why should not our industry be able to take similar advantage or our long 
coastline ... and rapidly flowing rivers?”31 Nations with soils that are low in 
buffering capacity suffer greater damage from acid deposition than those with 
high buffering capacity. A large, sparsely-populated country will suffer fewer 
adverse health and environmental effects from a given level of pollution 
emissions than will a small, densely populated country. Nations also differ in 
their existing levels of pollution and other forms of environmental resource
30 For further discussion of these factors, see Richard Stewart, Environmental Regulation 
and International Competitiveness, 102 Yale L.J. 2039 (1993).
31 See David Vogel, Environmental Protection and the Creation of a Single European 
Market 7 (1992) (unpublished paper presented at 1992 Annual Meeting of American 




























































































use. For example, those with lower levels, other things being equal, will be 
better able to accommodate additional pollution than nations that already have 
high levels of pollution.32
Social, cultural, and historical factors may lead different societies to attach 
more or less importance to environmental protection as opposed to expanding 
the supply of public and private goods and services. For example, even within 
Western European nations at comparable stages of economic development, 
there are striking differences in environmental orientation between nations 
such as Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands on the one hand and France, 
Great Britain and Italy on the other.
There are also differences in wealth among nations. Experience shows that 
societies treat environmental quality as a “luxury”; they demand relatively 
more of it as income rises and needs for housing, food and other “basics” are 
satisfied. Wealthier societies also tend to be better educated and therefore 
more cognizant of the importance of environmental protection. Thus, wealth­
ier nations are more likely to choose to devote a higher percentage of their re­
sources to environmental protection. Wealth and associated educational levels 
also affect nations’ abilities to develop strong, capable administrative authori­
ties to devise, implement, and enforce effective environmental protection 
measures.33
Finally, nations differ in their stage of economic development, which affects 
not only their wealth but also the composition of their productive output. 
While there is no “iron law” that produces a fixed, uniform pattern of eco­
nomic development, most contemporary nations have moved from economies 
that are based primarily on agriculture, to a stage of intensive industrializa­
tion, and then to patterns in which service industries are increasingly impor­
tant.34 Nations at the intermediate stage of intensive industrialization are likely 
to produce proportionately more pollution and other forms of environmental
32 This conclusion must, however, be qualified by noting that nations with relatively pris­
tine environments may have a strong interest in preserving them; in such a nation, the 
marginal harm of an additional increment of pollution may be greater than in a nation al­
ready moderately polluted.
33 One measure o f enforcement levels is the funding for enforcement efforts. In 1991, the 
U.S. per capita budget of the Environmental Protection Agency was $24.40; the Mexican 
per capita budget o f  the Mexican environmental agency (formerly SEDUE, now 
SEDESOL), was $.48. The Mexican figure in 1989, however, was only $.08. See 
Juanita Darlin et al., Can Mexico Clean Up its Act?, L.A. Times, Nov. 17, 1991, at A1 
(citing Congressional Research Service data).
34 See Colin Clark, The Conditions of Economic Progress 492 (3d ed. 1957) (pointing out 
that as economies develop, employment declines in agriculture then in manufacturing); 
Ronald K. Shelp, Beyond Industrialization: Ascendancy of the Global Service Economy 




























































































degradation in relation to GDP than nations whose economies depend primar­
ily either on agriculture or services.35 It will accordingly be relatively more 
costly for such nations to achieve a given level of environmental quality than 
those in which industry constitutes a smaller percentage of output.
These several variables will mean that different nations will vary in their 
capacity to assimilate pollution and other adverse environmental effects of re­
source use. They will also differ in the extent to which citizens are willing to 
forgo other public and private goods and services to prevent environmental 
degradation. Accordingly, the governments of different nations, each respon­
sive to the welfare of its citizens, could justifiably adopt environmental re­
quirements of quite different stringency. These requirements would appro­
priately reflect the effective assimilative capacity of the environment in each 
country.36
Investment in polluting industry should flow to nations with lower standards 
and greater assimilative capacity. This flow of investment benefits the resi­
dents of these nations, who place a higher priority on expanding the output of 
public and private goods and services or can assimilate pollution with less en­
vironmental damage. It also benefits residents of nations with higher standards 
and lower assimilative capacity, who would suffer greater welfare loss if pol­
luting industries were located in their country. This beneficial flow of invest­
ment is driven by variations in relative competitive advantage attributable to 
the differences in national standards.37
On this analysis, adoption of uniform standards would lead to inappropri­
ately high standards in nations with higher assimilative capacity, forcing them 
to devote too few resources to non-environmental goods and services which 
they would otherwise prefer. It might also lead to inappropriately low stan­
dards in other nations. Uniform measures would thus reduce welfare by re­
straining trade without producing compensating benefits.
Competitive Rivalry and the “Race to the Bottom”. Despite the economic ar­
gument for different environmental standards in different states, it has been
35 Robert E.B., Lucas et al., Economic Development, Environmental Regulation and the 
International Migration of Toxic Industrial Pollution: 1960-88, in P. Low, ed., supra 
note 24, at 67, 67-69.
36 See Judith M. Dean, Trade and the Environment: A Survey o f the Literature, in P. Low, 
ed., supra note 24, at 15, 15-16; see also James E. Krier, The Irrational National Air 
Quality Standards: Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 323, 324-330 (1974) 
(criticizing uniform air quality standards in the United States for ignoring variations in 
costs and benefits of pollution control among states).
37 See Martin C. McGuire, Regulation, Factor Rewards, and International Trade, 17 J. 




























































































argued that a system which allows states to adopt different standards might 
lead to competition among states to adopt less burdensome and costly require­
ments in order to favor its own industry in international competition, produc­
ing a Prisoner’s Dilemma38 that results in a “race to the bottom” in standards. 
According to the argument, each nation, acting independently, fears that other 
nations will adopt lax environmental requirements, and that it will therefore 
suffer serious competitive disadvantage if it adopts the more stringent re­
quirements that it prefers. Since each nation reasons in the same way, all adopt 
less stringent requirements than they would prefer individually. This argument 
is often accompanied by the expressed fear that industry will attempt to play 
one state off another and engage in “blackmail.”
This argument is most frequently voiced in the context of process regula­
tions, where a state’s imposition of costly requirements will increase its indus­
try’s manufacturing costs and thereby disadvantage it in trade competition. It 
is also potentially applicable to product regulation. If state A’s manufacturers 
have to meet stringent and costly regulatory requirements for products sold in 
the domestic market, they will either have to sell the same product abroad or 
manufacture a separate export product line. In either event, they are likely to 
incur higher costs than competitors in states with lower standards. The race to 
the bottom argument is also potentially applicable to waste disposal and treat­
ment regulation, but few nations seem eager to compete in the waste handling 
business by adopting lax standards. The implication of the “race to the bottom” 
argument is that uniform minimum standards should be adopted in order to 
forestall destructive competition.
The response to the “race to the bottom” argument is that there is no reason 
to suppose that international competition for comparative advantage will lead 
nations to adopt inappropriately low environmental standards. In a purely do­
mestic context, a government must weigh the benefits of environmental 
protection against the cost of forgoing other goods and services that could be 
produced by the resources devoted to environmental protection. In the inter­
national context, those costs may also include reduced competitiveness in the 
world market, a cost set by the existing levels of environmental requirements 
throughout the world. Each nation will weigh this cost against the benefits of 
enhanced environmental protection, which are a function of its assimilative 
capacity. Each nation will achieve its own balance between cost and benefit. 
On this analysis, there is no Prisoner’s Dilemma and no race to the bottom.39
38 See R. Duncan Luce & Howard Raiffa, Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical 
Survey 94-97 (1957).
39 See Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the “Race to the 
Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (1994). 




























































































There may nonetheless be ways in which a “race to the bottom” might occur. 
One possibility is that national political systems are myopic. The government 
of nation A may lower its standards in order to gain competitive advantage, 
not foreseeing that B will reduce its standards in response. When B matches its 
reduction, A may reduce its standards still further in the false expectation of 
securing a permanent advantage. Such extreme myopia, which might produce 
a never-ending downward spiral in standards, seems highly implausible. A 
more realistic possibility is that A is uncertain about the exact value that B’s 
political system places on environmental protection and how B’s government 
will respond to A’s choice of standard, and vice-versa. If each nation’s choice 
of standards depends on those chosen by other nations, if each is uncertain as 
to what choices others will make, and if each is unsure how others will 
respond to its choices, it is possible that all nation might indeed adopt lower 
standards than they would otherwise prefer.
But, if nations compete for mobile capital by lowering their environmental 
standards, harmonizing standards at a relatively high level will not eliminate 
such competition altogether. Rather, it will simply shift the competition into 
other forms, such as lower occupational health and safety standards or lower 
taxes for funding social programs.40 If so, one must justify giving priority to 
eliminating competition in environmental standards, or advocate worldwide 
uniformity in all government regulations affecting the cost of producing goods 
and services.
Environmental Externalities. Externalities can both cause and result from 
inadequate process standards.41 Environmental process standards are likely to 
be less stringent than otherwise when some of the adverse environmental ef­
fects of a process are imposed on other nations, for example through trans­
boundary pollution. The state in which the processes are located is likely to 
pay little or no attention to the interests of other states, and accordingly, it will 
fail to adopt adequate requirements. For many years Britain did not control 
sulfur emissions from its power plants because most of the adverse effects 
were experienced in Scandinavia and elsewhere.42 Environmental externalities 
are not limited to physical spillovers of pollution or wastes. Many individuals
Put in somewhat different terms, it may be conceded that the decisions of one nation 
about environmental standards create externalities for other nations by reducing or en­
hancing competitive effects. These externalities, however, are pecuniary ones and there­
fore should not produce market failures.
40 See Revesz, supra.
41 Environmental externalities can also be associated with product standards. Consider, for 
example, an upwind state that adopts relatively lax standards for air pollution from auto­
mobiles, much of which is carried to downward states.
42 See, e.g., Richard Wallis, Sweden Criticizes Britain Over Acid Rain Pollution, Reuters 




























































































care deeply about the preservation of rare or environmentally significant re­
sources in other nations, or even about localized pollution. Some nations may 
allow destruction of their tropical rain forests because most of their own citi­
zens do not care greatly about preserving them, even though many people in 
other countries are extremely distressed by the disappearance of rare species 
and ecosystems.43 Regardless of the form of environmental externality, na­
tions will often fail to adopt appropriate environmental standards because the 
costs of more stringent standards will be borne by the nation adopting them, 
whereas a significant portion of the benefits will accrue to those in other 
nations.
A somewhat different form of incentive problem is present in the case of the 
global commons, such as the atmosphere, the oceans, or Antarctica. Biological 
diversity might also be regarded as a form of global commons, even though 
many biological resources are located within natural boundaries. All nations 
may benefit if each acted to protect the commons from despoliation, but it may 
be that no nation has an adequate incentive to take such action. Each nation 
may, for example, benefit from measures to eliminate emissions of chlo- 
roflurocarbons (CFCs) that destroy upper atmospheric ozone, causing an in­
crease in cancer-causing ultraviolet radiation at the earth’s surface.44 
Similarly, it may be in the mutual interest of all nations to limit whaling in 
order to prevent the extinction of whales.45 From the viewpoint of any one 
nation it may not, however, be rational to unilaterally limit CFC emissions or 
whaling because most of the benefits of such action would accrue to others, 
while it would bear all of the costs. If this is true for each nation, no nation 
will adopt restrictions, even though all nations would be better off if each did. 
Under this “tragedy of the commons” scenario, no one will prevent the despo­
liation of the commons.46 On the other hand, a few nations, who may be eco­
nomically developed and deeply committed to environmental protection, may 
find the benefits to them of preserving the commons sufficient to justify uni­
lateral protective measures. Nonetheless, other nations may choose to “free 
ride” on their efforts, enjoying the benefits while contributing nothing of their 
own. Finally, states may also adopt lax standards for other reasons, such as the 
quest for competitive advantage. These standards can cause environmental 
degradation or psychic loss in other countries because of environmental 
externalities.
43 See, e.g., David Adamson, Defending the World: The Politics and Diplomacy o f the 
Environment 90-104 (1990).
44 See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn and Albert M. McGartland, The Political Economy of 
Instrument Choice: An Examination of the U.S. Role in Implementing the Montreal 
Protocol, 83 Nw. U.L. Rev. 592, 595 (1989).
45 See, e.g., Anthony D ’Amato & Sudhim K. Chopra, Whales: Their Emerging Right to 
Life, 85 Am. J. Int’l L. 21, 22 (1991).




























































































The importance to be accorded to environmental externalities depends criti­
cally on their extent. Many environmentalists believe that everything is con­
nected to everything else, and that the regional and global environmental ex­
ternalities generated by local activities are pervasive and powerfully destruc­
tive. If this is the case, far-reaching regional or international agreements or 
authorities would be necessary to deal with such systematic and compelling ex­
ternalities. Such externalities would also reduce the importance of, and there­
fore the need to accommodate, national differences in ecological conditions 
and values that would otherwise justify substantial differences in standards 
among states. Thus far, however, science has established relatively few acute 
physical environmental externalities of broad scope; these include stratospheric 
ozone depletion, atmospheric buildup of greenhouse gasses, loss of 
biodiversity, and instances of regional air or water pollution problems. Con­
cerns based on externalities should therefore be focussed on these problems.
Ecological Imperatives and Democratic Values. The considerations discussed 
above are largely utilitarian in character. They involve factors that must be 
considered in how best to promote overall welfare. But the debate over trade 
and the environment also involves important moral and political values that 
transcend welfare maximization.
Many environmentalists maintain that environmental protection is an ecolog­
ically-based ethical imperative. They invoke a variety of justifications for this 
position. Some hold that a safe and healthy environment is a basic human 
right. Others stress obligations to future generations to preserve the earth’s re­
sources, including the diversity and beauty of those resources. Still others as­
sert that humans have duties to other species or to nature herself.47 The com­
mon implication of these positions is that environmental policy should not be 
based solely on welfare-maximizing factors such as assimilative capacity. 
Rather it must be based on global ethical and ecological imperatives. A further 
implication is that there is no virtue in allowing each state to choose whatever 
level of environmental protection it believe appropriate for its circumstances. 
Rather, all nations and their citizens have a common obligation to protect the 
earth’s environment at levels necessary to protect human health, preserve the 
resource base, and preserve non-human species and the ecosystems which sus­
tain life. Accordingly, all states should adopt a common, high level of envi­
ronmental protection. Considerations of trade, economic welfare, and state 
autonomy should be subordinated to this common goal. This position is rein­
forced by the view, noted above, that environmental externalities are systemic 
and important. If environmental externalities are indeed pervasive, states may 
not ignore the adverse impact of their environmental policies on citizens of
47 See Edwin M. Smith, The Endangered Species Act and Biological Conservation, 57 




























































































other states, on future generations, and the biosphere itself. They are obliged 
to join in common protective measures.
A quite different normative position with directly opposed implications is 
based on the important political virtues in the ability of a state or other politi­
cal unit to chose its own environmental policies, based on its assessment of its 
own needs and priorities. In a democratic state, the virtues of self-determina­
tion extend to the people as a whole, and their ability to shape their own com­
munity and its destiny. Decisions about the use of common resources, includ­
ing the air and water, are central to a political community’s self-governance. 
This view finds especially strong support in the developing countries, who of­
ten regard efforts by environmentalists and developed nations to foster their 
adoption of environmentally protective measures as a new form of colonial­
ism. The developing countries often claim that scientific uncertainty is too 
great to justify large economic sacrifices for potential threats such as climate 
change, and that in any event the burden of any sacrifice should fall on the 
rich countries who have built up their economic base by despoiling the earth.
C. The Relation Between Trade/Environment Issues and Different 
Types of Environmental Problems
The arguments for and against uniformity of environmental regulation 
among states trading in a common market are quite different, depending on 
whether the regulation in question concerns products, processes, or wastes.
Product Regulation. Different state product regulations pose an obvious and 
immediate threat to the realization of a common market. The threat stems 
from the strong strategic position of states importing products manufactured 
elsewhere. A state that is downwind of an air pollution source in another state 
cannot block the pollution. Nor can it block lax environmental regulation in 
another state that may give industry a competitive advantage in world markets. 
In the case of products, however, self-help is readily available. A state that 
adopts comparatively stringent and costly product regulations can prevent 
noncomplying imports from harming its industry by excluding or prohibiting 
their sale. This form of self help, however, can be used for protectionist pur­
poses. If followed by many states, it can also lead to a tangle of conflicting or 
cumulatively burdensome requirements preventing full realization of the ben­
efits of the common market.
A basic requirement of common market or trade law is that state regulation 
must be facially nondiscriminatory. But states seeking competitive advantage 




























































































benefit domestic manufacturers. Facially nondiscriminatory product regula­
tions are often designed in such a way as to give a competitive advantage to lo­
cal firms. For example, the U.S. banned imports of Canadian lobsters that did 
not meet the minimum size requirements imposed by the U.S. on lobsters har­
vested in the U.S., despite evidence that Canadian lobsters are naturally 
smaller because Canadian waters are colder.48 The disputes between the U.S. 
and the European Union (EU) over the U.S. ban on EU wine containing trace 
residues of pesticides and the EU ban on U.S. beef from cattle that had re­
ceived bovine growth hormones are also illustrations of environmental and 
health measures that have been attacked as disguised trade restrictions.49 
Moreover, manufacturers in a state with more stringent or otherwise distinc­
tive standards are likely to enjoy scale economies in complying with such re­
quirements and thus obtain a competitive advantage over importers. For ex­
ample, German producers have complained that Danish container recycling 
requirements undercut their ability to compete with Danish brewers in the 
Danish market.50 Domestic producers are also likely to be more familiar with 
the domestic regulatory and legal system and therefore better able to deal with 
it.
Quite apart from these discriminatory effects, differences in standards 
among states impair trade by forcing manufacturers to learn about and re­
spond to different regulations in different states, thus increasing transaction 
costs and undercutting the economies of scale achievable in a common market 
with uniform standards.
All nations and producers have a basic common interest in harmonizing 
their product regulations in order to reduce transaction costs, efforts at dis­
guised protectionism, and other trade barriers resulting from differences in 
national standards. Harmonization promotes the advantages of a more exten­
sive product market: specialization, scale economies, and increased competi­
tion. The importance of these factors is reflected in the proposed North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which has extensive provisions
48 See Lobsters from Canada, 1990 WL 299945 (U.S. Can. F.T.A. Binat. Panel, May 25, 
1990) (upholding U.S. ban).
49 See Ban on Some European Wines May End, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1991, at A 10; Don't 
Let Hormones Start a Trade War, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1988, at A26.
50 The European Court o f Justice upheld most aspects o f the Danish law against a claim by 
the European Commission that the law unlawfully interfered with the common market. 
See Case 302/86, Commission v. Denmark (Re Disposable Beer Cans), 1988 E.C.R. 
4607, 1 CMLR 619 (1989) (upholding deposit-and-retum system on containers, but 
striking down requirement that only certain approved containers could be used as viola­




























































































designed to promote harmonization of product standards.51 To be sure, it is 
not always easy to agree on common standards. Differences in environmental, 
social, and economic conditions among nations may make different product 
standards appropriate. Environmental groups fear that harmonization will 
weaken standards in the U.S. and other nations with the most stringent stan­
dards, while producers in developing nations complain that they cannot afford 
to comply with more stringent requirements.52 Moreover, the impairment to 
free trade resulting from different standards is a matter of degree. The legiti­
mate interests of states in having different environmental standards may justify 
variations in product standards among different states.
Process Regulation. The potential conflicts between trade, competitiveness, 
and process regulation and liability rules are different, more serious, and 
more intractable. Producers in states with more stringent regulatory require­
ments and expansive liability rules will incur higher costs in complying with 
regulatory requirements and avoiding liability. These higher costs will, other 
things being equal, disadvantage such producers competing in both domestic 
and international markets. Moreover, states are generally have little in no 
ability to prevent environmental degradation within their borders resulting 
from pollution spillovers from nations with lax standards. They also can not 
directly enforce pollution control or resource preservation requirements 
within the territory of other states.
In order to deal with the competitive and environmental impacts of lower 
standards in other states, states with higher standards might seek to exclude or 
impose special duties on products imported from states with lower standards. 
Such measures, however, are generally illegal under international trade law,53 
and cannot in any event insulate domestic producers from the competitive dis­
advantage they face in third markets. Nor can nations with more stringent 
standards prevent multinations from moving operations to nations with laxer 
environmental requirements. Litigation is, as a practical matter, of little assis­
tance in the case of most pollution spillovers, and affords no remedy for com­
petitive disadvantages or for preservation losses in other states.
In these circumstances states disadvantaged as a result of lower standards in 
other states can only obtain relief through federal or supranational legislation
51 See North American Free Trade Agreement, Chs. 7B (Sanitary and phytosanitary mea­
sures), 9 (general standards-related measures).
52 See Matthew Hunter Hurlock, Note, The GATT, U.S. Law, and the Environment: A 
Proposal to Amend the GATT in Light of the Tuna/Dolphin Decision, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 
2098, 2131-33 (1992); John Burgess, Competing in a Diverse Market; U.S. Firms Seek 
Unity on Product Standards in Europe, Wash. Post, Dec. 2 ,1991 , at A l.




























































































or agreements among states. The result generally sought is adoption of uni­
form minimum standards, allowing individual states to adopt and enforce 
more stringent process standards if they choose. However, the common inter­
est in harmonizing process standards is typically much weaker than the com­
mon interest in harmonizing product standards, where harmonization can in­
crease the economic welfare of all nations by removing trade barriers. 
Differences in process measures by themselves do not create trade barriers. 
Despite evidence that the competitive significance of differences in environ­
mental process regulatory standards is modest,54 states that have adopted less 
stringent standards presumably wish to retain whatever economic benefits, in­
cluding competitive advantages, that such standards confer, as do industries lo­
cated in those states.Industries in states with more stringent standards would 
prefer to see their competitors subject to the same standards, but the interests 
of their competitors is diametrically opposed. Finally, it is far more difficult 
to monitor and enforce compliance with common process measures than it is 
compliance with product standards.
The potential competitiveness consequences of different process standards 
has excited deep political controversy, as illustrated by the U.S. debates over 
ratification of the NAFTA. For example, environmental and union groups as­
serted that if trade with Mexico were liberalized, Mexico’s weaker environ­
mental requirements would lead U.S. industry to relocate there.55 The 
“Reagan-Bush” version of “free trade” was attacked as producing a situation 
where “the lowest common denominator prevails” in environmental regula­
tion.56 Politicians, invoking the concept of “fair trade”, denounced “pollution 
havens,” and voiced concern that competition among nations in regulation will 
result in a “race to the bottom”, substantially weakening U.S. regulatory stan­
dards.57 President Clinton asserted that Mexico should tighten its environmen­
54 See Richard Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 
Yale L.J. 2039, 2061-2084 (1993) (reviewing and evaluating empirical studies).
55 See Environmentalists, Labor, Others Join in Conference on International Trade, Int’l 
Env’t Daily (BNA), Aug. 27, 1992; Stephen L. Kass and Michael B. Gerrard, The North 
American Free Trade Agreement, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 2, 1992, at 3.
56 Peter DeFazio, The Environmental Cost o f Free Trade, 7 J. Envtl. L. & Litig. 9 (1992). 
The author is a Member o f Congress from Oregon.
57 See NAFTA: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Int’l Trade o f the Senate Comm, on 
Finance, 102d Cong., 2d Ses. (1992); Baucus Says NAFTA Still Needs to Bridge Gap 
on Mexican Environmental Enforcement, 1992 Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 
130, at D-14 (July 7, 1992), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, DREXEC File; 
NAFTA: No Direct Sanctions Allowed if  Mexico Lax in Environmental Enforcement, 





























































































tal standards “so we don’t have people running down there so they can evade 
all the Clean Air Act” requirements.58
The attention given to the competitiveness impact of different environmental 
process standards seems analytically and factually misplaced. The debate ig­
nores the benefits of environmental protection. If U.S. citizens prefer high 
levels of environmental quality, then the costs -  including the costs associated 
with reduced international competitiveness -  of efficiently achieving those 
quality levels are appropriate. Of course, there may be a questions whether the 
quality levels chosen are excessive, or the legal and policy instruments used to 
achieve those levels are inefficient, resulting in unnecessary costs. In these cir­
cumstances, however, competitiveness per se should not be the central con­
cern. Rather, the concern should be the overall performance of the economy, 
including the environmental benefits as well as the economic costs generated 
by government regulatory programs and liability rules. U.S. environmental 
policies and regulatory instruments may unjustifiably retard U.S. productivity 
and growth, quite apart from their effects on international competitiveness, 
because they ar often misdirected and are excessively costly in relation to the 
environmental benefits that they provide.59 Also, when plant closings and re­
locations can be attributed to weakened U.S. competitiveness, the issue focuses 
public and political attention in a way that charts and numbers illustrating 
lagging U.S. productivity or regulatory inefficiency do not.
Second, the available empirical studies fail to establish that differences in 
environmental process standards have a major impact on competitiveness, 
whether competitiveness is defined in terms of productivity growth, im- 
port/export patterns, or industrial location. Differences in the level and type of 
environmental regulation do affect productivity growth and trade patterns and 
may have influenced the location of a few industries, such as basic chemicals. 
But even in the most heavily regulated industries, environmental compliance 
costs represent only a small percentage of manufacturing costs.60 Nonetheless, 
there are limitations to the empirical studies, which fail to address a number of 
potential effects of environmental measures on investment and innovation. 
Moreover, industry may have an incentive to highlight the potential 
competitiveness impacts of environmental regulation as a reason against 
adoption by a state of new and more costly regulatory requirements. Also, as
58 Clinton Endorses NAFTA But Says Pact Needs to be Strengthened, Int’l Trade Daily 
(BNA), Feb. 22, 1993.
59 See Stephen Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive 
Alternatives, and Reform, 92 Harv. L. Rev. 547, 553-59 (1979); Richard B. Stewart, 
Regulation, Innovation, and Administrative Law; A Conceptual Framework, 69 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1256, 1263-76 (1981).




























































































illustrated by the NAFTA debate, environmentalists emphasize potential 
competitiveness effects in order to support initiatives to require nations with 
lower standards to raise them to the levels in nations with higher standards.
When uniform process standards are adopted, the emphasis on competitive­
ness concerns influences the type of standards adopted. Such standards tend to 
be based on adoption by all facilities in a given industry of BAT standards on 
pollution or waste generation, as opposed to environmental quality standards 
that would allow different facilities to generate different amounts of pollution 
or waste depending on the character of their receiving environments. The lat­
ter are more appropriate from a welfare economic perspective. The BAT ap­
proach, however, tends to narrow the differences in compliance costs among 
facilities compared to the ambient approach. This approach is favored -  in the 
name of avoiding “competitive distortions” -  by those firms that would other­
wise face relatively more costly requirements, as well as by environmentalists.
Regulation of Wastes. Waste can be regarded as a negative product that 
commands a negative price; generators have to pay others to store and dispose 
of their wastes. Free trade in wastes should promote joint welfare for reasons 
similar to those that justify free trade in ordinary goods and services: 
economies of scale in disposal techniques, comparative advantage based on 
geology and transportation access, and innovation through specialization. If a 
waste commands a positive price because of the potential for recycling, it can 
be regarded as a product or resource with potentially hazardous characteris­
tics. A regime of free trade in wastes assumes that the recipient of the wastes 
commands and is paid a market price for disposing of them. Prohibiting illegal 
cross-border dumping of wastes is entirely consistent with and indeed nec­
essary to support a FTR.
States in the United States have enacted legislation banning or imposing spe­
cial restrictions on the import and disposal within the state of out-of-state 
wastes. However, the public in many states acutely fears the hazards associated 
with toxic and radiological wastes, and is often adverse to assuming respon­
sibility for wastes of any sort generated in other states. Many states have 
therefore attempted to impose bans or other restrictions on imports of out-of- 
state wastes. Unlike discriminatory product import restrictions, such measures 
benefit local “consumers” by reducing their exposure to waste hazards, as well 
as benefitting local producers of waste by foreclosing access by others to local 
disposal facilities.61 Also, many nations have acceded to arguments that it is
61 In addition, supporters o f such legislation have asserted that a ban on out-of-state wastes 
is necessary to create adequate incentives for minimizing waste generation and providing 




























































































improper to export wastes to less developed nations, and have joined in bans 
on such exports.
D . The Relation Between Trade and Environment in Different 
Multi-State Institutional Settings
1. The United States and the European Union
Although political integration has proceeded appreciably further in the 
United States than the European Union, there are broad similarities in many 
aspects of environmental regulation in these two systems of plural states linked 
by a common market.
With respect to product regulation, the initial responsibility for dealing with 
differing state standards has fallen to the high court which exercises the nega­
tive sanction of invalidating state measures that discriminate against other 
states or otherwise unduly frustrate the workings of the common market. In 
the United States, the Supreme Court invokes the negative commerce clause 
doctrine.62 In the Community, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) utilizes 
Articles 30, 34, and 36 of the Rome Treaty, prohibiting Member State mea­
sures that have the effect of restricting or hindering trade, unless they are jus­
tified as promoting “the protection of health and life of humans, animals, or 
plants” and do not represent a “means of arbitrary discrimination or a dis­
guised restriction on trade”.
From Rewe-Zentrale-AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fu r Branntwein 
( “Cassis de Dijon”j63 to the Danish returnable bottle case64, to the Walloon 
wastes decision,65 the ECJ has sought to balance the interests in a common 
market and economic integration with the interests of a member state in envi­
ronmental, health and safety protection, through techniques quite similar to 
those employed by the United States Supreme Court. The common judicial 
techniques include a prohibition on overtly discriminatory measures, an as­
sessment of other trade-burdening measures by examining the proportionality 
between the benefits secured and burdens imposed, the availability of less re-
why a disposal fee adequate to cover the full social costs o f waste disposal could not 
provide the appropriate incentives.
62 U.S. Const, Art. I, §8, cl 3. See, for example, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 US 137 
(1970); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 US 349 (1951); Minnesota v. Clover 
Leaf Creamery Co., 449 US 456 (1981).
62 Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale-AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fiir Branntwein, 1979 
ECR 649, 1979:3 CMLR 494.
64 Case 302/86, supra note 50.




























































































strictive alternative measures, and other evidence of discriminatory purpose.66 
The Danish bottle case, which bears a striking resemblance to a U.S. decision 
upholding an Oregon recycling measure,67 shows that courts in both systems 
are prepared up to a point, to uphold Member State environmental measures 
despite their adverse impact on trade and potentially protectionist motives.
The second technique for dealing with differing state product standards is 
legislation imposing uniform standards. Both the United States and the 
European Union have adopted uniform standards for the most environmentally 
significant categories of products, including motor vehicles, fuels, detergents, 
pesticides, and other chemical products.68 In the European Union, product 
legislation is more systematic than process legislation because of the mutual 
interest of all states in avoiding barriers to the free flow of products 
throughout the internal market.69 There is no great problem in enforcing 
Community product legislation, because member states can effectively prohibit 
the sale or use of non-complying products within their borders.
When legislation adoption uniform standards has been adopted, a key re­
maining question is whether states may establish and enforce standards more 
stringent those adopted through Community legislation. To the extent that they 
can, the threat to the internal market remains. The federal courts in the United 
States regularly confront this issue under the rubric of preemption, asking 
whether Congress meant to exclude more stringent state regulation. Sometimes 
statutes clearly answer the question one way or another, but often, because of 
political stalemate among states nationally-organized and interest groups, 
statutes are silent or ambiguous. The decisions of the Supreme Court on this 
subject do not provide much illumination for the ECJ, which must consider 
similar issues in a different constitutional context.
66 The Walloon Wastes decision, however, upheld a discriminatory ban on solid waste im­
ports.
67 American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm’n, 15 Or App 618, 517 P2d 691 
(1974).
68 For United States legislation, see, for example, Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and 
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 USC §§ 136-136; Clean Air Act, 42 USC §§ 7401-7671 
(1983 & Supp 1991); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 USC §§ 2601-2671 (1982 & 
Supp 1992). For Community legislation, see, for example, Council Dir 91/441,1991 OJ 
L242 (amending Council Dir 70/220 on the approximation o f the laws of the Member 
States relating to measures to be taken against air pollution by emission from motor 
vehicles); Council Dir 86/94, 1986 OJ L80:51 (amending for second time Directive 
73/404/EEC on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to 
detergents).
69 See Eckard Rehbinder and Richard Stewart, Legal Integration in Federal Systems: 




























































































Article 100A of the Treaty authorizes legislation, approved by a qualified 
majority, for the harmonization of member state measures in order to pro­
mote the establishment or functioning of the internal market. Article 100A(4) 
provides that if a member state wishes to adopt different national provisions 
“on grounds of major needs referred to in Article 36, or relating to protection 
of the environment or the working environment”, it shall so notify the 
Commission. “The Commission shall confirm the provisions involved after 
having verified that they are not a means of arbitrary discrimination or a dis­
guised restriction on trade between member states.”
Case-by-case court invalidation of particular state standards is not a viable 
means of dealing with assertedly inadequate state process regulation. The se­
lective sanction of nullity cannot solve problems due to pollution spillovers, 
potential competitiveness concerns, or normative demands for stronger control 
measures. In order to deal with these problems, the U.S. Congress and the 
European Union have widely adopted legislation imposing controls on process­
generated air pollution and water pollution, and toxic wastes, central command 
and control regulatory legislation imposing uniform minimum standards on all 
states and on all sources within given industrial categories. States are typically 
left free to adopt more stringent requirements.
The determination of the appropriate stringency of regulatory standards, 
which legislation in the United States but not in the Community has generally 
left to administrators, must inevitably strike a balance between environmental 
considerations, economic considerations and the different interests of states 
and industry groups. From the viewpoint of trade and competitiveness, the 
structure of standards is often as important as the level set because adoption of 
common standards does not mean that all firms in a given industry will be 
faced with the same compliance costs. For example, uniform environmental 
quality standards -  specifying the maximum permissible concentration of pol­
lutants in the air or water -  give a relative advantage to those states whose air, 
or water is relatively unpolluted because they can accommodate new industry 
and additional pollution without violating the standards. By contrast, uniform 
technology-based standards deny such states competitive advantage, although 
different facilities will face different compliance costs depending on their cir­
cumstances (including such things as the facility’s age or processes) and pre­
cisely how the standards are framed. Different states and businesses will also 
be affected differently by a system that imposes more demanding standards on 
new sources than on existing sources as compared to a system that imposes the 
same controls on both. Most legislation in both the United States and the 




























































































Process regulation in the United States is comprehensive, and enforcement is 
vigorous. The federal government, or in some cases the states by delegation 
turn the federal government, ensure permits to facilities incorporating regula­
tory requirements. Regulated facilities must file regular compliance monitor­
ing reports with the government. The federal government brings administra­
tive, civil and criminal enforcement actions directly against firms that violate 
requirements. The states also have broad enforcement powers. The major fed­
eral environmental regulatory statutes contain “citizen suit” provisions autho­
rizing “any person” to bring civil enforcement activities against violators.70
The amount of legislation dealing with pollution by industrial processes that 
the Community has enacted despite conflicts of interest among member states 
and a difficult legislative process that has required agreement by all member 
states or by a qualified majority of such states is remarkable. However, there 
remain major gaps, most notably in the areas of hazardous air and water pol­
lution and toxic waste cleanup.71 In addition, there have been very serious 
problems in implementing and enforcing the extensive legislation which the 
European Union has adopted.72 Process regulations must be enforced by the 
states against their own industries. States that place a higher priority on indus­
trial development or are concerned about the relative competitive position of 
their industry will be tempted to delay and compromise the execution of 
Community legislation. The absence of direct Community enforcement au­
thority and the lack of strong sanctions for Member State recalcitrance invite 
such footdragging. Ironically, the record of Community legislation may be as 
extensive as it is precisely because member states do not expect to be held to 
full and prompt compliance with the requirements adopted.
The completion of an internal market comprising an “area without internal 
frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is 
ensured”,73 and the development of a common currency are expected to stimu­
late a higher level of economic development, which threatens to create com­
mensurate increases in pollution and other forms of environmental degrada­
tion. A Commission report predicts that these increases will outstrip current 
Community regulatory efforts to reduce air pollution to safe levels, and will
70 See, e.g., Clean Air Act §304, 42 USC §7604.
71 This pattern may reflect the fact that such hazards are less likely to result in extensive 
transboundary problems than conventional air and water pollutants. The pollution o f the 
Rhine by toxic releases ia a notable exception to this generalization. See Jan M. van 
Dunne, ed, Transboundary Pollution and Liability: The Case o f the River Rhine 
(Lelystad: Vermande, 1991).
72 See R olf Wagenbaur, The European Community’s Policy on Implementation of 
Environmental Directives, 14 Fordham Int’l L.J. 455 (1990-91).




























































































exacerbate transboundary hazardous waste problems.74 Moreover, the com­
pletion of an internal market will increase the importance of competitive con­
cerns, potentially increasing the unwillingness of some member states to en­
force community legislation vigorously.
Regional differences and conflicts have played an important role in some as­
pects of U.S. environmental policy. Environmentalists and representatives of 
the more heavily polluted northeastern and midwestern states helped enact 
legislation imposing special limits on additional pollution in areas with cleaner 
air in the south and the west.75 Competitiveness concerns also lead representa­
tives of such states to insist on the adoption of nationally uniform technology- 
based standards for identical sources of water pollution. Regional conflicts 
between midwestern states, where major sources of sulfur-emitting coal com­
busting electric generating plants are located, and northeastern states suffering 
acid deposition from such sources blocked federal legislation to deal with the 
problem for over a decade.
Differences among the member states in the European Union are far greater 
than the differences among states in the U.S. Particularly significant is the 
contrast between the highly economically developed case and the less devel­
oped periphery. The Community has sought to accommodate the interests of 
its less industrially developed members in two ways.76 First, the EU has, in 
one instance, adopted different levels of control for different Member States. 
The 1988 directive on large combustion plants establishes ceilings on total 
loadings of SO2, NOx, and total suspended particulates through a differential 
formula that allows some of the industrializing member states to increase their 
existing emissions while forcing already industrialized states to achieve signif­
icant reductions. This compromise emerged only after a long political strug­
gle. The other technique for dealing with the situation of the industrializing 
Member States is financial transfers. The EU has used its European Regional 
Development Fund to finance environmental protection measures in less afflu­
74 See European Commission Task Force on the Environment and the Internal Market, 
“1992”, The Environmental Dimension.
75 See Clean Air Act §§160-169B, 42 USC §§7470-7479,7491-7492.
76 Fewer differences in industrial development exist among states in the United States than 
in the EU, but they still play an important role in the development o f environmental pol­
icy. For example, states in the West that are less developed and have relatively clean air 
have opposed stringent national emission limitations on new sources and prevention-of- 
significant-deterioration restrictions on increases in pollution loadings. These measures 
have been favored by the industrialized states in the Midwest and Northeast, who fear a 
shift in development to the West. See generally Bruce A. Ackerman and William T. 
Hassler, Clean/Dirty Air: or How the Clean Air Act Became a Multibillion-Dollar Bail- 
Out for High-Sulfer Coal Producers and What Should be Done About It (1981)’ B. Peter 
Pashigian, Environmental Regulation: Whose Self-Interests Are Being Protected?, 23 




























































































ent regions. Maastricht endorsed a greatly expanded program of Community 
aid to industrializing regions and those with especially severe environmental 
problems in order to cushion the burden of complying with Community legis­
lation. But the member states are already beginning to resist paying the $75 
billion cost of this and other Maastricht initiatives.
Transboundary pollution from industrial, commercial, and agricultural pro­
cesses presents special problems that are likely to become more apparent as the 
EU’s environmental regulation matures.77 The EU, like the U.S., has sought to 
deal with transboundary spillovers by the adoption of common measures to 
reduce pollution from all Member States. The U.S. experience suggests, how­
ever, that this will not be a wholly adequate long-run strategy. As controls be­
come more stringent and more expensive, downward states will seek to shift 
more of the costs of control to upward states. Moreover, in both the U.S. and 
the E.C., many transboundary pollution will require differing regional struc­
tures in lieu of the present system of uniform regulation. Congress recognized 
the need for regional differences in 1990 when it created the Ozone Transport 
Commission to develop a coordinated strategy for dealing with ozone pollution 
in the northeastern states,78 and also adopted five different sets of compliance 
timetables and requirements for achieving the ozone standards in different 
urban areas with ozone pollution problems of differing severity.79 There is 
also increasing recognition in the U.S. of the need for regional approaches to 
water pollution control.80 Thus, there is emerging recognition that the “one- 
size fits all” logic of BAT command and control regulation is ecologically 
unsound.
Special problems are presented by interstate shipments of waste, which can 
be viewed as a negative product. There is strong public opposition in most 
states to accepting for disposal wastes generated in other states. This opposition 
is especially strong in the case of hazardous and radioactive waste. On the 
other hand, some states wish to export wastes, either because they lack suitable 
disposal capacity or because disposal is cheaper elsewhere. The United States 
Supreme Court has held that waste is a proper article of commerce and has in­
77 For general discussion of transboundary pollution issues in the EU context, see Note, 
The Environmental Policy o f the European Economic Community to Control 
Transnational Pollution -  Time to Make Critical Choices, 12 Loyola LA Int’l & Comp. 
L.J. 579 (1990). The magnitude o f transboundary pollution problems in the EU is 
illustrated by the fact that in eight out o f the twelve Member States, pollution originating 
outside the Member State accounts for between one-third and three-fourths of acid 
deposition within the state. See Note, EC Regulation of Sulfur Dioxide Levels: Directive 
89/427, 14 BC Inti & Comp L Rev 369, 375 n.54, chart A (1991).
78 Clean Air Act §184,42 USC §751 lc.
79 Clean Air Act §181,42 USC §7511.




























































































validated discriminatory state legislation prohibiting disposal of waste origi­
nating from other states.81 The recent decision by the ECJ in Commission v 
Belgium,82 agreed that wastes were “goods” protected by the free trade prin­
ciples of Article 30. Nonetheless, the ECJ upheld legislation by the Wallonia 
region of Belgium imposing a ban on wastes imported from outside the region 
for disposal, insofar as it was applied to bar imports of non-hazardous solid 
waste from the Netherlands. The ECJ validated this facially discriminatory 
measure by characterizing waste as a special case because of its environmental 
effects, referring to a waste disposal “emergency” in Wallonia, and invoking 
the principles of “self-sufficiency” and “proximity” for waste disposal set forth 
in Article 130R of the Treaty.
Both the United States and the European Union have comprehensive legisla­
tion regulating the treatment and disposal of hazardous waste.83 In addition, 
the U.S. has a far-reaching system of liability for remediating hazard ous sub­
stance contamination.84 But none of this legislation directly addresses the 
question of a state’s ability to restrict waste imports from other states. In the 
Wallonia wastes case, the ECJ, nonetheless held that Wallonia’s ban on imports 
of hazardous waste was impliedly preempted by EU legislation insofar as it 
was applied to bar imports of hazardous wastes from the Netherlands haz­
ardous waste legislation because EU requires an exporting state to notify the 
receiving state of shipments and relies on the latter to police compliance with 
Community requirements regarding treatment and disposal.85 The ECJ’s de­
cision upholding Wallonia’s ban on non-hazardous waste but invalidating its 
ban on hazardous waste has stimulated efforts to adopt EU legislation address­
ing the controversial issue of interstate waste shipments. Such legislation is 
also under consideration in the U.S. has caused controversy and confusion.
81 City o f Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 US 617 (1978). Notwithstanding this decision,
strong local opposition to disposal o f  out-of-state wastes have led states, such as 
Alabama, with substantial disposal capacity to find various ways to exclude out-of-state 
wastes. The Supreme Court has invalidated such discriminatory measures. See Chemical 
Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 112 Ct 2009 (1992).
83 Case 2/90, Commission v. Belgium (July 9, 1992).
83 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 USC §§6921-6939e; Directive 
78/319/EEC o f 20 March 1978 on toxic and dangerous waste, OJ L84, 31 March 1978, 
p.43.
84 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 USC  
§§9601-9675.
85 Council Dir 84/631, 1984 OJ L326:31 (on the supervision and control within the 




























































































2. International Trade and the Environment
The natural, economic, and institutional features of the international setting 
give trade and environment issues a quite different character than those in a 
federal-type system such as the United States and the European Community.
Some resources are beyond the territorial jurisdiction of any state. The most 
notable examples are Antarctica, the oceans, and the living resources which 
they contain. The global atmosphere is likewise outside the jurisdiction of any 
nation, although this feature does not distinguish it from airsheds shared by 
states in a federal-type system. Within the global atmosphere there from re­
gional airsheds is more or less uniform mixing of certain pollutants, such as 
Greenhouse gases (GHGs) and chloroflourocarbons (CFCs), creating a situa­
tion in which each nation is both a polluter and is also exposed to the adverse 
effects of pollution. The amount of pollution emitted, however, varies greatly 
among nations. The adverse environmental effects of stratospheric ozone de­
pletion and global warming are also not uniform across nations.
There are many more nations in the world than the number of states in the 
United States, or member states in the European Union. Moreover, far greater 
disparities exist among nations -  in terms of natural resources, economic de­
velopment, wealth, education, and governmental systems -  than are found in 
federal-type systems. Even the North/South division that has figured so 
prominently in discussions of international environmental law and policy ig­
nores many differences among the “North” and the “South” nations. For ex­
ample, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) nations, 
the “Asian Tigers”, the nations of subsaharan Africa, and the Latin American 
countries have quite divergent interests.
There is no international legislative authority with power to enact statutes 
that bind nations. The World Court exercises adjudicatory authority only with 
respect to controversies between nations as such, when such nations have vol­
untarily consented to the Court’s jurisdiction. That jurisdiction is limited and 
rarely invoked. The adjudicatory authority of GATT dispute resolution panels 
and other tribunals created by bilateral or regional trade or environmental 
agreements such as the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) has 
been used only intermittently. The underdeveloped state of international 
institutions has made it far more difficult to develop either a FIR or an effec­
tive system of environmental protection among nations than among the states 
in a federal-type system like the United States or the European Community. It 





























































































The GATT is a world FTR regime created by consensus among the partici­
pating nations. Some of its basic ground rules, such as the requirement of na­
tional treatment and provisions recognizing, within, limits the authority of na­
tions to exclude products that present risks to health or the environment, are 
consistent with those developed by the United States Constitution and the 
United States Supreme Court, and by the Treaty of Rome and the European 
Court of Justice. There are special provisions, however, such as those recog­
nizing the nations’ interest in avoiding balance-of-payments problems, that are 
unique to an international system of independent nations. The GATT also 
provides for dispute-resolution institutions -  panel tribunals with a right of 
appeal to a council composed of representatives of all nations that are parties 
to the GATT -  to make the inevitably contextual judgments involved in appli­
cation of these broad principles in particular cases. The procedure for appeal 
of GATT panel decisions to an essentially political process of negotiation 
among participating nations in the council again reminds us that the GATT is 
an association of independent nations and not a federal-type system that estab­
lishes sovereign suprastate authority. The GATT does not specifically address 
environmental issues as such. A working group on trade and environmental is­
sues, authorized in 1971, had never met until recently, and environmental 
groups have come to regard the GATT as at best indifferent and often hostile 
to environmental concerns.86 Environmental issues, however, acquired greater 
saliency at the end of the Uruguay Round, in large part as a result of the 
NAFTA debate, and institutional commitments have been made for greater 
consideration of environmental issues by the new World Trade Organization. 
As illustrated by the CFC-related trade restrictions in the Montreal Protocol, 
international environmental agreements must increasingly address trade issues. 
At the same time, the GATT and regional trade agreements must increasingly 
address environmental concerns.87
International environmental protection has theoretical roots in customary 
international law, which has articulated a general obligation of nations not to 
act in ways that inflict injury on the territory of another nation. But the pre­
cise nature and content of this obligation remains quite unclear because vir­
tually no relevant decisions have been made by the World Court or other in­
ternational tribunals. Most international environmental law has grown out of 
bilateral or multilateral treaties. The negotiation of these agreements is a slow 
and cumbersome process, and each sovereign nation may decide whether to 
adhere to them. The great differences among nations produce acute conflicts
86 See, e.g., Alex Hittle, Trade and the Environment at an Impasse, ENVTL. F„ July-Aug. 
1992, 26.
87 See John H. Jackson, World Trade Rules and Environmental Policies-Congruence or 





























































































of interest that impede agreement. Substantial progress has nonetheless been 
made in reaching or developing multilateral agreements dealing with endan­
gered species,88 chemical testing and labelling,89 the development of Ant­
arctica,90 hazardous waste treatment,91 depletion of stratospheric ozone due to 
emissions of CFCs and other chemicals,92 global warming,93 and biological 
diversity.94 It is noteworthy that these agreements have not been focused on 
one particular type of externality, such as product risks, but encompass many 
different types of environmental problems. In addition, the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has set an important precedent by 
specifically addressing environmental issues in the context of a regional trade 
liberalization agreement.
Even when international agreements have been reached, there remains the 
problem of nonsignatories who seek to free-ride on others’ efforts to preserve 
common resources or reduce pollution spillovers. Monitoring, implementa­
tion, and enforcement are also very serious problems, as environmental 
groups have pointed out in the debate over the environmental aspects of the 
NAFTA pact.95 There is no supranational environmental police or regulatory 
authority. Reliance must generally be placed on information disclosure, scien­
tific and public opinion, moral suasion, and the implicit or explicit threat that 
sanctions, such as trade restrictions, will be imposed, or side benefits, such as 
aid, will be withheld from those who do not comply.96
In the area of product regulation, harmonization of national standards would 
benefit consumers in all nations by eliminating the barriers imposed by
88 See, e.g., Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species o f Wild Fauna and 
Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter CITES],
89 See, e .g ., OCED, Principles o f  Good Laboratory P ractice , OECD Doc. 
ENV/CHEM/HLM/80.1 (Apr. 11, 1980), reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 1057.
90 See, e.g., Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, June 
2, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 868.
91 See, e.g., Basel Convention on the Control o f Transboundary Movements o f Hazardous 
W astes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 657 [hereinafter Basel 
Convention].
92 See, e.g., Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete The Ozone Layer, Sept. 16, 
1987, 26 I.L.M. 1550, amended and adjusted 30 I.L.M. 539 (1991) [hereinafter 
Montreal Protocol].
93 See, e.g., United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 899.
94 See, e.g., Convention on Biological Diversity, May 22, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 822.
95 See J. Ward, Environmental Enforcement: Unfinished Business in North American 
Trade, Testimony of the Natural Resources Defense Council before the Senate Finance 
Committee Subcommittee on International Trade (Sept. 16, 1992).
96 See generally Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the 




























































































different standards to realization of the full benefits of international trade. But 
differences among nations in assimilative capacity and the social value placed 
on environmental protection create impediments to common standards. Work 
to harmonize regulatory and labelling standards for chemicals is proceeding 
under the auspices of the GATT, the OECD, and international environmental 
and health organizations. Understandably, it has been much more difficult to 
harmonize environmental standards for other types of products, such as auto­
mobiles, where differences in assimilative capacity are often much more im­
portant. It makes little sense to have the same automotive emission controls in 
Mali as in Japan. Harmonization has also been impeded by the insistence of 
nations, such as the U.S., that others adopt their relatively stringent standards 
(“harmonization up”) or that they retain the right to set standards more strin­
gent than those adopted by international agreement.
Differing national requirements for resource exploitation and manufacturing 
processes present other considerations. Harmonization of process measures 
cannot be justified on the ground that it promotes consumer welfare by re­
moving impediments to trade, Indeed, to the extent that existing variations in 
national standards appropriately reflect national differences in assimilative ca­
pacity and social values, eliminating those differences would reduce consumer 
welfare. Existing standards are often too low, however, because of two types 
of externality problems. In the first type of problem, exemplified by trans- 
boundary pollution and the destruction within a given country of rare ecosys­
tems and endangered species, part of the costs of environmental degradation 
are borne by those in other jurisdictions. In the second type of problem, ex­
emplified by stratospheric ozone depletion, climate changes threatened by 
greenhouse gas emissions, and over-exploitation of the ocean’s resources, all 
nations face a potential tragedy of the commons. Some form of collective 
agreement is necessary to deal with these externalities and to prevent envi­
ronmental degradation that reduces total welfare.
Negotiation of international agreements to harmonize environment process 
standards is no easy task. The number of countries is large, their interests are 
quite diverse and often sharply conflicting, and international institutions are 
underdeveloped and highly imperfect. Because of their more urgent need for 
economic development, citizens of developing countries often place a lower 
value on reducing environmental externalities than citizens of developed 
countries. The joint economic benefits of common process standards are often 
far less than those of common product standards. Competitiveness concerns 
are also highly important. Rather than providing a solution to international 
competitiveness concerns, international negotiations may become a new battle­
ground of economic rivalry as each country or group of countries seeks to 




























































































advantage.97 Implementation and enforcement also presents very serious 
problems. One must rely on the signatory parties to enforce agreed-upon stan­
dards against their own industries. Many signatories may lack either the ca­
pacity or the will to do so effectively, particularly where international com­
petitiveness concerns play a political role.
Given the difficulties in achieving agreement on common measures and the 
obstacles to effective implementation and enforcement, international environ­
mental law with respect to processes should focus on the problems of the 
commons and other externalities where the case for joint action is greatest and 
considerations of natural self interest tend to favor such action.
Process-based externalities would exist in the absence of trade, although the 
economic development fostered by the trade may increase the magnitude of 
such externalities. Trade measures are, however, a potential means of enforc­
ing process standards, whether national or international. The United States has 
gone the farthest in imposing unilateral trade sanctions against other nations 
who do not adhere to what the U.S. regards as appropriate measures to protect 
common resources, including whales and fish. Recently, concerns over com­
petitiveness sparked by the NAFTA debate have led to proposals in the U.S. 
for general tariffs that would impose duties supposedly equal to the cost ad­
vantage enjoyed by firms in other countries with environmental process 
standards less stringent than those in the U.S.
97 For example, in the global climate negotiations the EU sought agreement on specific tar­
gets and timetables for limiting fossil fuel CO2 emissions. Leading EU nations, such as 
Germany, had already concluded that such limitations were desirable for purely economic 
reasons relating to plant modernization and productivity. Others, such as France, were 
committed to expanding their already formidable nuclear generating capacity. The U.S. 
has abundant fossil fuel resources, especially coal, which emits higher amounts o f CO2 
per energy yield than other fossil fuels. An agreement restricting fossil fuel CO2 emis­
sions would therefore disadvantage U.S. industry relative to industry in the EU. The 
U.S. opposed limitations on fossil fuel CO2 alone, arguing for a comprehensive ap­
proach which would include all greenhouse gases (GHGs), their sources, and their 
sinks. OPEC nations, including Saudi Arabia, also opposed fossil fuel CO2 limitations. 
On the other hand, developing countries like Brazil were concerned about the potential 
extension of any agreement to include non-fossil CO2 and methane emissions resulting 
from deforestation. In the end, no binding limitations were agreed to. The Climate Con­
vention is a framework convention; agreements on specific limitations of GHG emissions 
must await future protocols.
The EU has debated a proposed energy fuel tax based in part on carbon content o f fuel, 
but at the insistence of European industry the proposal would become effective only if 
Japan and the U.S. adopted CO2 limiting measures that impose comparable financial 
burdens on their industries. Proposal for a Council Directive Introducing a Tax on 




























































































The U.S. has been the leader in imposing unilateral restrictions, although it 
could well become a target if, for example, the EC imposed an energy/carbon 
tax to curtail CO2 emissions and imposed countervailing duties on imports 
from the U.S. if it failed to adopt a similar tax. Such measures could be justi­
fied as internalizing the external costs of environmental degradation and 
establishing a level playing field for competition.98 The difficulty with these 
justifications is that the costs of environmental degradation are a function of 
societal values and other elements of assimilative capacity which vary from 
nation to nation. There is no objective or uniform “cost” of pollution. Given 
the serious potential for protectionist abuses of unilateral measures based 
solely on different standards in other countries, the GATT appropriately views 
such measures as violating international trade law.
The U.S. ban on imports of Mexican tuna caught on the high seas with an 
incidental take of dolphins in excess of U.S. regulatory standards was invali­
dated by two GATT panels.99 The panels drew a sharp distinction between 
trade restrictions on products that present a risk of harm to health on the envi­
ronment, which the panels indicated would generally be upheld against chal­
lenge under GATT if based on standards that are also applied in a non-dis­
criminating fashion to imported and domestically produced products alike, and 
trade restrictions aimed at the environmental effects of processes outside the 
importing nation’s borders, which the panels indicated are generally unlawful 
under GATT.
The panels’ rationale would essentially make all process-based trade restric­
tions GATT illegal. The nationale seems too broad, for it fails to address the 
special problem of effectively protecting resources in the commons, outside 
any nations’ jurisdiction, and also fails to consider whether multilateral trade 
restrictions involved in aid of international environmental agreements should 
be treated differently under GATT than unilateral measures. Pursuant to the 
CITES convention, states have regularly enforced bans on imports of animals 
or products of animals that are protected as endangered under the Convention. 
The Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention, which provides for substan­
tial reductions in the manufacture and use of ozone-depleting chemicals by the 
signatories, which include the developed nations and many developing nations 
provides for bans of imports from non-signatories of products manufactured 
by use of such chemicals as well as products imports from non-signatures of 
the chemicals themselves or products containing them. These provisions are
98 See Frederic L. Kirgis, Environment and Trade Measures After the Tuna/Dolphin 
Decision , 49 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1219, 1224 (1992); David A. Wirth, The Inter­
national Trade Regime and the Municipal Law of Federal States; How Close a Fit?, 49 
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1389,1399-1401 (1992).




























































































designed to provide incentives for countries to join the convention, as well as 
to protect signatories from trade competition by free-riders. Substantial ar­
guments can be made that such measures should be upheld under GATT.'00 
An alternative, followed in the NAFTA, would be specific agreement among 
GATT members to validate or grant a waiver for specific multilateral trade 
restrictions in specific international environmental agreements. The use of 
trade sanctions to enforce international agreements on environmental standards 
for processes is a topic that will be at the center of future international law and 
policy.
International trade and transport of wastes is a politically charged issue be­
cause of the reluctance of many states to accept others’ waste the inability of 
many developing countries to ensure appropriate treatment and disposal of 
hazardous wastes, and the widely-held view that it is immoral for the devel­
oped countries to ship their wastes to developing countries. The Basel 
Convention adopted a closely-regulated system of trade in hazardous wastes 
that requires notice to and consent by the importing country to specific ship­
ments. The Basel signatories have recently agreed, however, to a ban on ex­
ports of hazardous wastes from developed to developing countries. Also, the 
Bamako Convention bans exports to and imports of hazardous wastes to 
African nations. Powerful arguments can nonetheless be made in favor of 
some forms of trade in hazardous wastes. Economies of scale in treatment and 
disposal and the differing environmental suitability of potential disposal sites 
may make it inappropriate to require each state to dispose of all its own waste. 
In addition, absolute bans on trade encourage illegal traffic in wastes, as many 
examples of unlawful disposal in developing nations attest.
100 See Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and Environment: Lessons from the Federal 




























































































E. The Use of Economic Incentives to Protect the Environment in 
a Multi-State Context
As explained in Part I, market-based incentives have a number of important 
advantages over traditional command and control regulation. These include 
achieving environmental objectives at less cost; providing both the flexibility 
and the incentives for development and adoption of innovative, less-polluting, 
more resource-efficient products and processes; eliminating the need for a 
large and cumbersome central planning bureaucracy; and promoting demo­
cratic accountability. Market-based systems retain all of these advantages when 
applied in a multi-state setting as opposed to a single state. Moreover, several 
aspects of market-based incentives make them especially well-suited for deal­
ing with environmental problems in the context of trade among several states. 
Economic incentives harness the power of the expanded common market to the 
service of environmental protection. At the same time, they place fewer 
demands on the limited capabilities of international institutions than command 
and control regulation. This section discusses these and other advantages of 
economic incentives in the multi-state context and gives examples of actual or 
potential applications or market-based incentives in the United States, the 
European Community, and internationally.
Use of market-based incentives is most advanced in the United States.101 A 
panel of experts convened by the European Commission has recommended use 
of economic incentives in Community environmental legislation,102 as has the 
European Parliament Committee on Environment, Public Health, and 
Consumer Protection.103 The EU Council has sought, albeit unsuccessfully, to 
negotiate a tax on carbon/energy in fossil fuels to reduce emissions of CO2.104 
The use of market-based incentives is just emerging as a subject of interest in 
international environmental law, particularly in the context of implementing 
the Climate Change Convention.
The potentially most powerful applications of market-based incentives in the 
multi-state context are the use of taxes, tradeable permits, and other contrac­
tual approaches to deal with process pollution and wastes. The following dis­
cussion first examines these applications, and then briefly considers the poten­
101 See Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through Economic Incentives, 
13 Colum. J. Envtl. L. 153 (1988).
102 Report o f the Working Group o f Experts from the Member States on the Use of 
Economic and Fiscal Instruments in European Community Environmental Policy (1990).
103 See Committee's Report on Economic and Fiscal Instruments on Environmental Policy, 
Eur. Pari. Sess. Doc. A3-01301/91 (May 13, 1991).
104 See Proposal for a Council Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide Emissions 




























































































tial application of these and other market-based tools to other environmental 
problems.
Taxes and various forms of contracting, including tradeable emission re­
duction credits, use the comparative advantage and scale economies of the 
multistate Free Trade Regime (FTR) in order to achieve environmental objec­
tives at a substantially lower cost than if each state adopts its own regulatory 
program. Just as states benefit economically by participating in an expanded 
common market, they also benefit environmentally because resources are 
channelled to facilities that use resources more efficiently, reducing pollution 
and waste. The use of economic incentives in the FTR also widens the compe­
tition for innovation in environmentally superior technologies and promotes 
the rapid diffusion of successful innovations. Such incentives also promote 
structural shifts in the output of goods and services to emerging “green” sec­
tors of the wider economy. One example of these benefits is the U.S. program 
for a nationwide market for tradeable permits for sulfur emissions. It is pro­
jected for use of this market will reduce the costs of achieving a 50% reduc­
tion in sulfur emissions by over $1 billion annually compared to costs under a 
command and control approach.
Moreover, by reducing the costs of achieving environmental objectives, 
economic incentives make it easier for states to agree on common measures. 
The conflicts of interest that are inevitable in multi-state agreements can be 
significantly moderated if the costs of complying with commonly agreed-upon 
measures are significantly reduced. The U.S. sulfur trading program again 
provides an example of this benefit. Midwestern states and the Bush adminis­
tration would not have agreed to the 50% sulfur reduction program without 
the significant cost savings to be obtained from the trading program.
In addition, economic incentives provide diversity and flexibility in imple­
mentation, thus accommodating differences in circumstances among the vari­
ous states in a multi-state system. The decentralization inherent in economic 
incentives also serves interests in state autonomy. For example, under a trade- 
able permits approach each state could be given an allocation of permits and 
given the freedom to decide how such permits should be initially allocated. 
Command and control regulation generally follows a uniform “one size fits 
all” approach, creating obstacles to agreement among states with different cir­
cumstances. As illustrated by the history of the EU directive on reduction of 
sulfur emissions, in which different standards were applied to the industrial­
ized and industrializing states; departures from uniformity to accommodate 




























































































Economic incentives reduce the need for an extensive central bureaucracy 
and promotes democratic accountability by reducing the number of decisions 
that government must make. This consideration is especially important in 
multi-state systems where political and legal integration is incomplete, as in the 
European Union, or weak, as in the international community. For example, 
command and control regulation aggravates the EU’s “democracy deficit” by 
requiring that Brussels bureaucrats devise and seek to enforce through the 
Member States a uniform requirements for environmental protection. Taxes 
or tradeable permits ease this deficit by making the basic policy choice - the 
overall amount of tax incentive or permitted pollution - more transparent, and 
by eliminating the need for detailed central commands, thereby promoting the 
subsidiary principle.
In the international context, institutions are currently too weak to support a 
worldwide environmental regulatory bureaucracy capable of functioning like 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Creation of such a bureaucracy 
would in any event not be desirable. By contrast, the level of economic incen­
tives can be agreed upon through a convention or subsequent protocols, and 
the agreed-upon incentive levels can be implemented by each nation. Because 
nations can obtain revenues through the use of taxes or auctioned permits, 
implementation and enforcement problems are likely to be less severe than 
under a command and control approach.
As noted earlier, the application of tax, tradeable permit, or other contrac­
tual systems relies upon collection of accurate and complete information about 
emissions and wastes. Gathering information about total emissions and wastes 
may pose substantial technical, institutional and political problems. Accurate 
monitoring of some pollutants, such as the greenhouse gas methane, may be 
particularly difficult, although proxy measures for actual emissions can be de­
veloped. Professional and administrative capabilities in many nations are quite 
limited. Such information, is, however, necessary to ensure proper implemen­
tation and enforcement of regulatory programs. Moreover, the focus the envi­
ronmental “bottom line” of overall pollution or waste levels, which is inherent 
in the use of taxes, tradeable permits, or pollution reduction contracts, will 
provide accountability, enlist the resources of science, and help mobilize pub­
lic and political opinion against those states who fail to honor their undertak­
ings. These advantages are especially significant in the international context, 
where supra-national methods of direct enforcement are generally not avail­
able. It is very important to build monitoring and reporting capacity; use of 
economic incentives will favor this effort.
Economic incentive systems also provide an effective and economically ef­




























































































nations. Assisting these nations to take environmentally sound paths to devel­
opment will be critical to future protection of the earth’s environment, par­
ticularly in the case of global commons problems, including climate change 
and stratospheric ozone depletion, and the conservation of biodiversity. With­
out the necessary technological and fiscal resources, developing nations will be 
tempted to pursue development through technologies that may be cheaper in 
the short run but environmentally destructive and wasteful of resources over 
the longer run. Also, the developing countries often have very limited admin­
istrative and technical resources. Both developed and developing nations would 
benefit from the protection of ecologically valuable resources, such as tropical 
rain forests, that are located in developing countries, and reduction of global 
externalities such as emissions of greenhouse gases and ozone-depleting 
chemicals. Developed nations might also benefit from the creation of markets 
for exports of environmentally superior technologies. The developing coun­
tries have some responsibility to deal with loss of biodiversity and pollution 
externalities, but only in relation to standards appropriate to their own assim­
ilative capacities as well as to their proportionate contribution to common en­
vironmental problems. In these circumstances, it would be in the mutual inter­
est of the developed and developing nations contractually agile for the devel­
oping countries to undertake environmentally protective measures in exchange 
for the transfer of appropriate resources from the developed nations. 105
The Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention is an example of such a 
contract. It provides for financial assistance from the developed nations to the 
developing countries to cover the costs of changing production processes to 
accommodate chloroflorocarbon (CFC) substitutes and reduce use of CFCs.106 
This arrangement was vital in securing the assent of the Protocol. The 
Montreal Protocol also set an important precedent by explicitly107 including in 
the agreement both “sticks”, in the form of trade sanctions against 
nonsignatories, and “carrots”, in the form of payments from the more devel­
oped to the less developed countries to help finance the costs of phasing out the 
use of CFC’s.108 Such inducements were motivated by the urgency and seri­
ousness of the environmental problem in question -  stratospheric ozone deple­
tion -  and the need for common measures to deal with it. Carrots may be 
necessary in order to secure the cooperation of developing countries. Sticks 
may be necessary to overcome free-riding by nonsignatories, who benefit
105 por argument that such agreements can secure more economically efficient use o f re­
sources, see Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 Jl. Law & Econ. 1 (1960).
106 Montreal Protocol, supra note 92, at 1555-56.
107 See Karl Goran Maler, International Environmental Problems, 6 Oxford Review of  
Economic Policy 80 (1991).





























































































from the signatories’ environmental protection efforts and simultaneously en­
joy a cost advantage in international competition, and to meet potential ethical 
objections to relying solely on financial payments to induce nations to cease 
activities that harm the global commons.
The fact that both CFCs and their substitutes were developed and marketed 
by developed country firms provides a potential distinction to limit the prece­
dential effect of the financial transfer provision in the Montreal Protocol. But 
the Climate Change Convention and the Biodiversity Convention also condition 
agreements by the developing countries to undertake environmentally 
protective measures on provision of financial and technological assistance by 
the developed countries, extending the contractual approach to the conserva­
tion of biodiversity and prevention of spillovers from agricultural and silvi­
cultural as well as industrial, externalities. The Climate Change Convention 
provides that the developed countries that are parties to the Convention “shall 
provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs 
incurred by developing country Parties” to meet their obligations under the 
Convention.!09 The Convention also establishes a fund to help provide such 
assistance. 11°
Nevertheless, the extent of biolateral or multilateral fiscal transfers by the 
developed countries, and the willingness to relax intellectual property rights 
with respect to technologies in favor of the developing countries is likely to be 
sural in relation to the magnitude of the resources required to promote envi­
ronmentally protective development in the developing countries. The total 
amount of assistance being provided under the Montreal Protocol is in the re­
gion of a billion dollars. The amounts required to finance significant restric­
tions on GHG emissions from developing countries in the next several decades 
would run from hundreds to thousands of billions. Practical political factors 
would preclude direct transfers from the developed countries of anywhere 
near such amounts.
A system of tradeable permits is another form of contracting that furnishes 
an effective and politically palatable way of transferring capital and pollution- 
reducing technologies from the more industrialized to the less industrialized 
states. Such a trading system could be used to deal with regional air pollution 
problems such as sulfur emissions or emissions of ozone gases, or global 
problems, such as greenhouse gas emissions. Less developed states can be 
given relatively more allowances in recognition of their need for industrial 
development. Firms in the industrialized regions facing relatively high costs 
for reducing pollution could invest in pollution reductions in the industrializ- 1
109 Climate Change Convention, supra note 93, Art 4, para. 3.




























































































ing regions, where costs would likely be lower. These investments would in­
clude the use of sophisticated, environmentally superior technologies in new 
plants. Private investment, driven by competitive market forces, would en­
courage technological innovation and probably prove more effective and less 
costly than expenditures by public authorities for the same purpose, making an 
“ecological market economy” out of the FTR by creating property rights out 
of what would otherwise be common resources, and therefore overused.
Still another approach to contracting is to develop a system of property 
rights in natural resources. An innovative, market-based approach to preserv­
ing biodiversity which could set a broad precedent is an agreement between a 
major U.S. pharmaceutical company and the Government of Costa Rica in 
which the company agreed to finance preservation of tropical forest in return 
for preferential access to the forest’s genetic resources. A significant question 
is the extent to which such property rights should be subject to governmental 
ownership and control. The Biodiversity Convention recognizes property 
rights in the nation in which natural resources are located, and contains other 
language which could qualify private intellectual property rights, potentially 
undermining the efficiency of private market arrangements. On the other 
hand, giving nations a proprietary interest in genetic resources may be an im­
portant step towards more effective protection of biodiversity.
While pollution fees or taxes share all the basic economic advantages of the 
trading approach to contract, they lack some of the political and administrative 
advantages of trading. For example, they do not allow states flexibility in the 
allocation of pollution allowances, and do not harness market forces to trans­
fer capital and technology to the industrializing states in order to promote de­
velopment that is environment-friendly.l11 In the case of some environmental 
problems, such as GHG emissions, quite high fees or taxes would be needed in 
order to induce significant changes in polluting activities. There is often strong 
political opposition to such taxes, especially from industry with concerns over 
competitiveness, as illustrated by the demise of the European Commission’s 
proposal for an energy/carbon tax. Industry opposition to a trading system is 
likely to be less intense because they would probably not have to pay for their 
permits. Under a trading system the government could auction off permits, but 
in practice permits have been given to existing firms in proportion to the 
allowed emissions under preexisting regulatory requirements. In these 
circumstances, firms may be able to make a profit by reducing their pollution 
and selling their excess permits. Transfers of financial resources to developing 
states could be accomplished by earmarking a portion of developed country
1 '  Part o f the proceeds of a pollution fee or tax could be earmarked for investment in envi­
ronmental protection in the industrializing regions, but investment decisions would be 




























































































tax revenues for that purpose, the remainder being retained to offset, on a 
revenue-neutral basis, existing taxes on capital and labor. But the developed 
countries would be reluctant to entrust international bureaucracies with 
authority over vast revenues. There is also a tension between the revenue and 
incentive aspects of a pollution tax or fee. Finance ministers want a dependable 
fiscal base. Also, earmarking a portion of fee revenues for transfers to other 
states does not ensure efficient transfer of appropriate technologies to reduce 
pollution and waste in the most cost-effective manner.
While new forms of property rights, contract, and taxes of fees to deal with 
process pollution and wastes offer the greatest promise for progess, other 
forms and applications of economic incentives also have promise in the multi­
state market context. For example, the imposition of fees on pollution from 
automobiles and other environmentally undesirable product attributes could 
potentially provide more flexibility and fewer impediments to trade than 
command and control regulation. A system which imposed a fee on the gen­
eration of hazardous wastes and refunded that fee upon a demonstration that 
the wastes had been properly treated and disposed of would ameliorate the 
problem by making improper disposal unprofitable and providing the private 
sector with incentives to accurately track such wastes. The recently developed 
EU program of eco-labelling^2 would harness consumer demand by stimulat­
ing a common market for environment-friendly products.
The global climate policy debate vividly illustrates the contribution that eco­
nomic incentives can make to solving environmental problems in the context 
of a FTR among states. The costs of achieving significant limitations on GHGs 
are enormous. The use of internationally agreed command-and-control re­
quirement to limit the many different GHG sources and sinks would be ex­
traordinarily cumbersome. It is also doubtful that sufficient transfers of tech­
nology and other assistance from the developed to the less developed countries 
can be achieved through bilateral or multilateral assistance mechanisms. Most 
developed countries’ industries are reluctant to accept costly new GHG limita­
tion requirements that would disadvantage them in international competition. 
At the same time, some of these industries’ firms could enjoy rich market op­
portunities for sales of resource-efficient, technologies to developing coun­
tries. These several factors suggest the desirability of using a tradeable permit 
system might be to limit GHG emissions.! 13 Participating nations would agree 
to restrict net emissions of GHGs from their territory according to an agreed- 
upon schedule. Such an agreement would in effect establish a net GHG emis- 1
112 See Wagenbaur, 1992 U. Chi. Legal F. at 30 (cited in note 72).
113 See Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan Wiener, The Comprehensive Approach to Global 





























































































sions allowance for each participating nation. Nations that did not need to use 
their entire allotment could sell their excess allowances to others. Such sales 
could either be made between nations, or between private firms that had been 
allocated allowances by their respective nations. The Climate Change Conven­
tion allows parties to the Convention to adopt “joint implementation” measures 
for dealing with GHs.114 15This provision could be interpreted to allow broad 
development of trading systems.
In order to win their assent to limitations, developing nations could be given 
relatively more allowances than developed nations. This would represent a 
transfer of valuable in-kind assets to the developing countries, but in a form 
less likely to excite political opposition than would outright cash grants. Inter­
national market transfers of such allowances would be a quite effective way of 
transferring capital and appropriate technology to developing countries. For 
example, firms in developed countries would provide capital and know-how, 
including technology protected by intellectual property rights, to foreign na­
tions or firms to enable them to undertake economically productive activities 
in a more energy-efficient and environmentally beneficial fashion. The firms 
in the developed countries would be compensated for these investments in part 
by transfers from the developing countries of net GHG emission allowances 
that would no longer be needed because of the energy savings obtained as a re­
sult of the investment. The developed country firms could use such allowances 
themselves, or, more likely, sell them to other firms anywhere in the world. 
The development of an international “green” currency, in the form of net 
GHG allowances, would channel technology and resources to whereever in the 
world net GHG emissions could be reduced at the lowest cost. In addition to 
promoting transfers of capital and technology from developed to developing 
countries, economic incentive systems would, for reasons already explained, 
significantly reduce the costs of achieving reductions and avoid the need to 
create an elaborate international command-and-control regulatory author­
ity.1!5 Both of these features would promote the likelihood of agreement on 
targets and timetables for GHG limitations. This decentralized, market-based 
system could be supplemented by bilateral or multilateral governmental 
grants, but it would likely be far more effective in ensuring appropriate, cost- 
effective technology transfer than exclusive reliance on national and 
international government bureaucracies.
114 Climate Change Convention Act 4 §2(a).
115 There would have to be international agreement on the allocation of allowances. Once 
such an allocation was established, market transactions and nation-to-nation agreements 
would determine the extent of controls o f different GHGs for particular sources and the 
extent o f preservation and enhancement of particular sinks. Under a command-and-con- 
trol approach, each of these thousands of particularized decisions would have to be made 





























































































Harmonizing the many-sided relation between competitive markets and en­
vironmental protection is a central challenge for future domestic and interna­
tional law and policy. Command and control regulation is poorly suited to 
meet this challenge. Central planning approaches tend to create a false conflict 
between economic and environmental goals. Market-based approaches to envi­
ronmental conflict can erase this conflict by harnessing the enormous power of 
competition and the price system to capture resource externalities. The virtues 
of market-based approaches are especially apt in the context of trade among 
states. Reconciling free trade and environmental protection in situations where 
political integration is limited and supra national institutions are relatively 
weak requires approaches that economizing on government. Market-based 
incentives meet this need, and turn economic integration to ecological 
advantage, making environmentalists of Adam Smith and David Ricardo.
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